To behead or to hack?

The Saudis strike against Nepali migrant workers once more. Is it not enough to fail to protect them properly in a country renowned for gross human rights abuses?

Now they are going to behead or “hack” a Nepali man for what can only be regarded as manslaughter.

Death stalks Nepali worker stealthily

KATHMANDU, Nov 24: A Nepali worker from a remote village of Dhanusha district, who was recently sentenced to death by a Saudi Arabian court for murdering a Pakistani national five years ago, still unmindful of his tragic fate.

Nobody has informed Umesh Yadav, 31, who hails from Machijhitakaiya village of Dhanusha, that he is going to be beheaded soon as per a death sentence handed down by the Saudi Arabian court a week ago. A Nepali worker convicted in a similar case was hacked to death in Saudi Arabia some 10 years ago.

“He was pretty nervous,” said second secretary at the Nepali Embassy in Saudi Arabia Sagar Phunyal, who met Umesh in a Jubail-based jail, some 500 kilometers east of Riyadh, on Wednesday.

“But, he is yet to know that he has already been sentenced to death. And, Saudi Arabian officials can execute the verdict any time soon.”

According to Phunyal, some jail inmates have told Umesh that he can be hacked to death as per Saudi Arabian laws. However, it is difficult for Umesh to believe what he heard. “I also did not tell him anything,” Phunyal said, adding, “Had I told him about it, he could have lost all hope. I just told him to be patient.”

Umesh, who has a wife and two sons back in his village, had reached Jubail, a Saudi Arabian city, in 2006 to work as a migrant worker.

However, within less than two months after reaching Jubail, Umesh unfortunately engaged himself in a scuffle that ended up in the death of his fellow worker, Mohammad Wasir, a Pakistani national.

“He has confessed his crime. He says he did not kill Wasir intentionally,” Phunyal said. “But, another case of burgling was also filed against him. He does not accept this charge. He says Saudi Arabian police made him admit to this charge as well by severely beating him in the custody.”

He has been languishing in Jubail jail for over five years now. He had once come into contact with his family in Nepal to inform about his condition six months ago. However, his family has yet not approached the embassy. “We are trying to contact them as well,” Phunyal said over phone.

Efforts to save Umesh

Although Umesh has admitted to his crime, and the Saudi Arabian court has already delivered its verdict, the Nepali Embassy has initiated diplomatic efforts to save him. The embassy is all set to write an official letter to the foreign ministry of Saudi Arabia, asking the latter to halt the execution of death sentence for the time being. The date of execution has not been confirmed.

“We are also in touch with the Riyadh-based Pakistani embassy to save Umesh by providing a certain amount of blood money to the family of the deceased,” said Uday Raj Pandey, Nepal´s ambassador to Saudi Arabia. “The Pakistani embassy is positive. If the family of the victim does not turn down our request, we will look forward to collecting blood money.”

via MYREPUBLICA.com – News in Nepal: Fast, Full & Factual.

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Human rights in context: The case of Dalits in Nepal

This essay will examine the issue of caste-based discrimination against Dalits in Nepal. In its brevity, the essay is not intended to provide an all-encompassing description of human rights law, nor the internal workings of the UN system, but rather an overview of the issue and the way in which the international human rights treaty system in particular has responded, with a short recommendation as to what can be done to address the issue. Beforehand, however, it is important anthropologically and socio-politically to locate and define the origins and concept of ‘Dalit’.

“Untouchable” and “caste” have been greatly misused over centuries, particularly in the Western world.[1] As previously argued:

‘“Casta” is Roman for “lineage” used in Europe to define families of winemaking grapes. The Portuguese colonialists used the term to encompass two concepts, varna, which defines spiritual qualities and hierarchical ritual purity, and jati, endogamous hereditary groups. (Spencer-Shrestha 2006, p.2)

The status of being “untouchable” is therefore misleading; it describes a person that is avarna, (without varna[2]), an outcast (Dudley-Jenkins 2003, p.13), but equally part of the varna system, even if not defined within the traditional description of the varna body (Galanter 1984, p.8). Approximations as to the number of different jati that exist are as many as 100,000 across South Asia (Spencer-Shrestha 2006, p.3), none of which are region-wide, but many of which will be regarded locally as avarna. Historically, jati could climb up or fall down the varnas depending on a range of economic and social changes. The arrival of the British in South Asia changed this; seizing on the Manusmṙti and framing it as a legal text, they began to institutionalise and fix the intersection, leading some academics to regard “caste” as an entirely colonial construct (Zwart 2005, p.5).[3] Today, however, as Indian Supreme Court Justice Iyer has recognised, arguments over the past are defunct – the notion of “untouchable” has been interwoven into modern social reality (Sharma 1989, p.vii).

Discussions on how best to define “untouchables” began during the Indian push for independence. In Nepal, a great number of terms exist, including those that are offensive like achut (ritually polluting), pani nachalne (those not to share water with), pariganit (scheduled) and talo jat (low level jati), as well as those that are less offensive and merely descriptive, such as upechit (ignored), utpidit (oppressed) and bipana (downtrodden). In neighbouring India, Mahatma Gandhi’s attempt to use harijan (god’s people) from the 1930s onwards largely failed with many considering the term condescending. Instead, India utilised a legal terminology, ‘scheduled castes’ throughout its constitution and laws. Despite initial hesitation and controversy, in recent years, Dalit (‘suppressed’ in Sanskrit), first used by the activist Mahatma Jotiba Phule, has become the self determined term used across the region as a catchall to describe those jati that are avarna (DFID and World Bank 2006; UNDP 2008).[4] Dalit as the person who requires support and protection can therefore be separated from “untouchable”, as the practice that violates the rights of the former.

The issue

In Nepal, the practice of treating someone as “untouchable” is illegal. The 2006 Interim Constitution states that all citizens shall be equal before the law, with no discrimination on the basis of caste.[5] It goes further, creating a right against untouchability that when violated is both punishable and compensationable.[6] There are applicable articles on the right to social justice, covering inclusion of Dalits in state apparatus,[7] and the right against exploitation, particularly exploitation based on custom.[8] The Constitution outlines non-enforceable obligations, such as state policies that promise the restructuring of the state to include Dalits,[9] the repealing of all discriminatory laws,[10] the economic uplifting of Dalits,[11] and the pursuing of affirmative measures for Dalits.[12] Non-enforceable Directive Principles in the Constitution prevent economic inequality and exploitation,[13] and establish harmony between castes.’[14] Political parties are prohibited from registering if membership is caste-specific,[15] and Dalits should be included in the executive committees of all parties,[16] and proportional representation of Dalits is encouraged within the Constituent Assembly.[17]

The 1963 Muluki Ain, or country code, contains Nepal’s penal law. It provides under Article 10(a) of the Chapter on Decency, as amended in 2006, that any person discriminating on the grounds of “untouchability” or denying access to public areas or utilities on the basis of caste, may be punished with imprisonment of between three months and three years, or with a fine of between 1,000 and 25,000 rupees, or both (Government of Nepal 2007, para. 37). The 1954 Civil Liberties Act also requires equality before, and equal protection by, the law under Section 3, and prohibits restrictions on access to or denial of services on the basis of caste. Schedule I of the 1992 State Cases Act places the obligation of investigation and prosecution of caste-based discrimination offences under the responsibility of the state, in effect placing it under criminal law.

However, under Nepal’s civil law system such limited explanation of the offence of caste-based discrimination has led in practice to very few prosecutions. A wide-ranging report by the UN Development Program (hereafter, UNDP) on the status of Dalits in Nepal summarises:

‘[Nepali laws state that] no-one must be discriminated against on the grounds of caste, and “Any contravention of this provision shall be punishable by law”. But if no such law is ever passed, the provision has very little effect. (UNDP 2008, p.41)

According to another report from 2010, legislation has been shown to be inadequate and ineffective, lacking any proper definition of either “untouchability” or “caste-based discrimination” (National Dalit Commission and OHCHR 2010, p.4). As such, the review continues, the vagueness of the aforementioned legal provisions has led to a situation in which the police are unwilling to investigate and the authorities are reluctant to prosecute. Instead, police and the judiciary encourage appellants to settle cases using informal mediation. Moreover, despite the constitutional guarantee of non-discrimination, academics have identified 58 laws on the Nepali books that contain discriminatory content, which exclude, restrict, or segregate Dalits (Bhattachan, Sunar et al. 2007, p.7).

Article 154 of the Constitution establishes in as many words the National Dalit Commission (hereafter, NDC).[18] The government created the NDC in 2002 with a mandate to increase the participation of Dalits in ‘mainstream development’ and create a ‘favorable environment’ for equal rights.[19] The NDC is neither statutory nor has it any power, however. The well-regarded NGO, Asian Legal Resource Centre, has, in a shadow report to the UN, described the NDC as ineffective, non-independent and subject to political influence (Asian Legal Resource Centre 2003). It continues: ‘Despite the weight given to the National Committee in the report of the State, this agency has been a complete failure.’ The NDC has not taken advantage of its potential power to help Dalits, and nor has the statutory National Human Rights Commission (hereafter, NHRC) or the National Women’s Commission included or been responsive to, Dalits. All three mechanisms work under government departments rather than independently, and all are financially reliant on the whims of politicians. Worse still, the ‘political appointees’ running the NDC seem to have exercised the sole purpose of silencing any alternative Dalit opinions.

The last major census estimated the number of Dalits in Nepal at 3.6 million, or 13.8 per cent of the population.[20] Under the regime of limited legal protections, discrimination against Dalits has been identified by academics in 205 different practices: 54 based on denial of access, nine on forced labour, 20 regarding ‘dominance’, and the rest on other grounds such as occupation (Bhattachan, Sunar et al. 2007, p.4). This has led to severe differences in the poverty, education and health statistics between Dalits and non-Dalits, as shown in Tables 1, 2 and 3.

Table 1[21]

Literacy rate (6yrs+) Secondary school pass Undergraduate pass
Non-Dalit 49.3 % 15.8 % 3 %
Dalit 33.8 % 3.8 % 0.4 %
Dalit women[22] 24.2 %

 

Table 2[23]

Per cent below poverty line
Non-Dalit 46.8 %
Dalit 66.7 %

 

Table 3[24]

Per cent food sufficient Per cent food insufficient
Non-Dalit 41.9 33.3
Dalit 33.3 33.3

Qualitative research abounds as to the discrimination faced by Dalits, particularly Dalit women who are faced by multiple levels of discrimination being first a Dalit, then a woman, and finally a Dalit woman. While it is not the role of this essay to provide a repository of cases, a case study is fitting.

The case of Muna Devi Damai:

On 8 April 2003, Muna, a Dalit, was called to the house of her neighbours, Bir Bahadur and Parbati Thapa, both of the high Chetri caste. Upon arriving, Muna was taken by her hair and pushed to the ground by Bir, whereupon Parbati held her down. Both Bir and Parbati began to kick and punch Muna, before Bir brought human faeces pre-mixed with ground chilli and forced the concoction into Muna’s mouth. Muna, who had during this time been struggling and shouting for help, then fainted. Her children, too young to stop Bir and Parbati, had stood by crying and then carried the unconscious Muna back to their house. Later, other neighbours came to Muna’s house to express sympathy, but all refused to help. Muna tried to submit a First Information Report, the document required by police in order to investigate a crime, but local police refused to accept it. While the exact reason for the attack is unknown, the feeding of faeces is often the result of accusations of witchcraft (bokshi). Muna suffered multiple discriminatory acts, both from Bir and Parbati, to the community’s lack of help, to the police’s refusal to investigate (Asian Legal Resource Centre 2003).

The applicable international human rights treaties[25]

Nepal has ratified or acceded to a number of applicable international human rights treaties, including the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (hereafter, ICERD), the Convention on the Rights of the Child (hereafter CRC), the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (hereafter, CEDAW), the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (hereafter, ICCPR), the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (hereafter, ICESCR), and the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (hereafter, CAT).[26] Nepal signed, but has not yet ratified, the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, which binds all parties and requires them to perform treaties in ‘good faith’. However, Nepal’s 1990 Treaty Act confirms that all international human rights treaties prevail and have supremacy over national laws.[27]

The name Dalit or the terms “untouchable” or “caste” do not appear in any international human rights treaty. As such, human rights organisations and activists, exasperated by the failure of national legislation, courts and statutory bodies tasked with ending discrimination against Dalits campaigned for the identification of a precise source of international law that would force governments to change and provide redress (Keane 2007, p.8). Such a source was identified under ICERD’s definition of racial discrimination, which, as will be discussed later, became synonymous with caste.[28] Article 2 of ICERD states that Nepal should not only prohibit all forms of racial discrimination, but also take positive, proactive steps to end such discrimination, and is encouraged to take affirmative action,[29] necessary in order to achieve de facto non-discrimination. Article 4 goes further than the ICCPR[30] by requiring Nepal to declare illegal and prohibit organisations or actions that disseminate ‘ideas based on racial superiority or hatred, incitement to racial discrimination’, in clear conflict with the ICCPR’s prioritisation of freedom of expression.[31] Because of this clash, Nepal entered a reservation against Article 4, declaring its constitutional provision for freedom of expression more important, although in recent years the government has stated its willingness to withdraw the reservation.[32] A further issue within ICERD is the limitation of the provisions on the basis of citizenship, which is often withheld on the basis of racial discrimination.[33]

‘The convention is not applicable in cases of “distinctions, exclusions, restrictions or preference” made by a State Party between citizens and non-citizens and cannot be interpreted as affecting the laws regulating nationality, citizenship or naturalisation, “provided that such provisions do not discriminate against any particular nationality” […] The denial of citizenship as a tool for discrimination has been applied in several states (Rehman 2009, p.417)

This gap has since been clarified to add that access to citizenship itself can be a prominent discriminatory barrier.[34]

Further obligations in international law can be broken down according to treaty:

ICCPR: Article 2(1) and Article 16 are the primary provisions for non-discrimination in the ICCPR.[35] As a party to the ICCPR, Nepal is obligated to provide for everyone subject to its jurisdiction,[36] including Dalits, the prohibition of arbitrary denial of the right to life;[37] torture or cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment;[38] slavery, servitude, forced or compulsory labour;[39] arbitrary arrest or detention;[40] and unlawful attacks on honour or reputation.[41] Nepal is also obligated under the ICCPR to prohibit incitement to discrimination against Dalits,[42] and establish a criminal justice system that guarantees their equality before the law.[43]

ICESCR: Nepal is obligated under the ICESCR to guarantee economic, social and cultural rights, without discrimination against Dalits,[44] and take steps toward the realisation of such rights.[45] In addition, Dalits have the right to freely choose or accept work,[46] that remuneration for such work should be without distinction of any kind,[47] and that they must be able to exercise the right to ‘enjoy the highest attainable standard of physical and mental health.’[48]

CAT: Prohibition of torture ‘has been universally recognized as a customary international law norm and as a jus cogens norm applicable in times of war and peace, from which no derogation is permitted’ (Centre for human rights and global justice 2008, p.43). CAT forbids torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading acts for, ‘any reason based on discrimination of any kind’.[49] Nepal is obligated under CAT to take ‘effective legislative, administrative, judicial or other measures to prevent’,[50] criminalise,[51] investigate[52] and punish[53] torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading acts. Moreover, Nepal is bound to especially protect marginalised persons or groups such as the Dalits by, ‘fully prosecuting and punishing all acts of violence and abuse against these individuals.’[54]

CEDAW: Nepal is obligated to provide by all appropriate means the elimination of discrimination against women,[55] including Dalit women, while ensuring that their rights are not restricted by ‘customary and all other practices’ [sic].[56]

CRC: Nepal is obligated to respect and ensure the rights of Dalit children ‘without discrimination of any kind’ and protect such children ‘against all forms of discrimination or punishment on the basis of the status’.[57] Nepal is also required to protect Dalit children from economic exploitation or from carrying out any work deemed hazardous to their health and development.[58]

The aforementioned treaties require a situation of non-discrimination to be present on two levels, the formal or de jure establishment of non-discrimination within law, and a substantive or de facto situation of non-discrimination in practice.[59] As Meron states:

‘Past acts of discrimination have created systematic patterns of discrimination in many societies. The present effects of past discrimination may be continued or even exacerbated by facially neutral policies or practices that, though not purposefully discriminatory, perpetuate the consequences of prior, often international discrimination. (Meron 1985, p.298)

In order to fulfil its obligations, Nepal must ensure that no law, policy or institution provides de jure or de facto discrimination against Dalits,[60] including both direct, intentional discrimination and indirect discrimination.[61] Nepal is also obligated to ensure that there exists an, ‘effective remedy, notwithstanding that the violation has been committed by persons acting in an official capacity’,[62] to ensure that Dalits’ rights are protected. Furthermore, any Dalit who claims their right to effective remedy should have such ‘determined by competent judicial, administrative, or legislative authorities’,[63] supported by a government that undertakes to ‘ensure that the competent authorities shall enforce such remedies when granted.’[64]

Finally, Nepal is required to respect its human rights obligations, by not violating human rights, protect human rights, by protecting Dalits from abuse, and fulfil human rights, by providing effective remedies.[65] General Comment 16 of the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights also requires Nepal provide de facto support through the availability and accessibility of effective remedies and redress.[66]

The UN response

The UN has responded to the issue of discrimination against Dalits in Nepal in a number of ways. Two of the most important are the manner in which the Committee for the Elimination of Racial Discrimination (hereafter, CERD)[67] has reframed ICERD to include caste-based discrimination, and the second being the investigation of such discrimination by the UN Sub-Commission and the resultant creation of special rapporteurs and associated principles.

CERD’s major role in tackling discrimination against Dalits has been its recognition of caste-based discrimination as a form of racial discrimination, placing it under ‘descent’ in ICERD’s definition of racial discrimination[68] when making its 1996 Concluding Observations of India’s 10th to 14th periodic reports:

‘Noting the declaration in paragraph 7 of the report, reiterated in the oral presentation, the Committee states that the term “descent” mentioned in article 1 of the Convention does not solely refer to race. The Committee affirms that the situation of the scheduled castes and scheduled tribes falls within the scope of the Convention. It emphasizes its great concern that within the discussion of the report, there was no inclination on the side of the State party to reconsider its position.[69]

CERD’s move was due both to the external campaigning of INGOs such as the International Dalit Solidarity Network, and the internal work of CERD expert member, Patrick Thornberry, who argues in his book:

‘It is an obvious point – but easily missed – that the umbrella term for the Convention is ‘racial discrimination’, not race. Thus, racial discrimination is given a stipulative meaning by the Convention: as precisely the five terms set out in Article 1, which means ‘race’ but four other terms as well. It is thus clear that the scope of the convention is broader than […] notions of race, which in any case may express many usages. (Thornberry 2005, p.19)

Since 1996, CERD has published General Recommendation No. 29, which clearly states that caste-based discrimination falls under ‘descent’ and therefore fits the remit of ICERD:

‘[CERD is] Strongly condemning descent-based discrimination, such as discrimination on the basis of caste and analogous systems of inherited status, as a violation of the Convention,[70]

The Recommendation goes on to say that parties to ICERD have an obligation to identify those castes at risk,[71] legislate against caste-based discrimination,[72] implement such legislation,[73] and if necessary adopt affirmative action measures.[74] It also states that parties should especially consider women,[75] segregation,[76] and dissemination of ‘hate speech’.[77]

Since CERD’s recognition of caste under ‘descent’, the latter has been adopted as the de facto term representing discrimination against Dalits in international frameworks. This has not been without resistance; the government of India remains strongly hostile to such a link, and has said so in its repeated representations to CERD.[78] In its latest State Report to CERD, the Government of India repeated its case:

‘In this context the Government of India reiterates its position that ‘caste’ cannot be equated with ‘race’ or covered under ‘descent’ under Article 1 of the Convention. [79]

India maintains that while it is fully committed to providing affirmative action for ‘scheduled’ castes and tribes, caste pre-dates race theory (Keane 2007, p.10). CERD has however remained steadfast, advising in its 2007 Concluding Observations that:

The Committee takes note of the State party’s position that discrimination based on caste falls outside the scope of Article 1 of the Convention. However, after an extensive exchange of views with the State Party, the Committee maintains its position expressed in General Recommendation No. 29 “that discrimination based on ‘descent’ includes discrimination against members of communities based on forms of social stratification such as caste and analogous systems of inherited status which nullify or impair their equal enjoyment of human rights.” Therefore, the Committee reaffirms that discrimination based on the ground of caste is fully covered by Article 1 of the Convention.[80]

India has attempted to block the recognition of caste in other fora too. Despite caste appearing in early drafts of the outcome document for the World Conference Against Racism, Racial Discrimination, Xenophobia and Related Intolerance,[81] the final ‘Durban Declaration and Programme of Action’ includes no such reference, due to last minute lobbying by India and Nepal (Keane 2007). Since then, however, under pressure internally and externally, Nepal has distanced itself from India’s position, increasingly recognising in its submissions to the UN that caste-based discrimination is indeed a form of racial discrimination. In Nepal’s latest report to CERD in 2007, the government states that it is, ‘fully committed to the XXIX general recommendation of the CERD Committee’ (Government of Nepal 2007, para. 129).

Recognition of caste-based discrimination has been repeated in CERD ‘General Recommendation No. 32: Special Measures’ (2009) and CERD Concluding Observations for Bangladesh (2001), Chad (2009), India (1996 and 2007), Japan (2001 and 2010), Madagascar (2004), Mali (2002), Mauritania (2004), Nepal (2001 and 2004), Nigeria (2005), Pakistan (2009), Senegal (2002), United Kingdom (2003) and Yemen (2006). Although the ICCPR’s Human Rights Committee has remained largely silent on the violation of civil and political rights in caste-based discrimination, with the exception of one brief mention of India in 2000 (Keane 2007, p.18), other UN fora referencing caste have included: CESCR’s ‘General Comment No. 20: non-discrimination’ (2009) and reviews of India (2008), Japan (2001) and Nepal (2001 and 2008); CmDAW’s reviews of India (2000 and 2007), Japan (2009) and Nepal (2004); CmAT’s review of Nepal (2005); and CmRC’s review of Bangladesh (2009), India (2000 and 2004), Japan (2004), Mauritania (2009), Nepal (2005) and Pakistan (2003).

Following CERD’s recognition of caste-based discrimination as a form of racial discrimination, INGOs continued their campaign by urging the UN Sub-Commission, a body created (and since replaced) to investigate new human rights issues, to, during a working group on contemporary forms of slavery, ‘undertake a study on caste-based discrimination and its manifestations in contemporary forms of slavery in the south Asian region.’[82] Two years later, the newly renamed Sub-Commission responded, repeating CERD’s recognition, and supplementing ‘descent’ with ‘work’, and then deciding to, ‘entrust Mr. Rajendra Kalidas Wimala Goonesekere with the task of preparing […] a working paper on the topic of discrimination based on work and descent.’[83] By 2002, Goonesekere’s paper was complete and Asbjørn Eide and Yozo Yokota had been chosen to expand, or possibly dilute, the paper to include countries outside of Asia.[84] After Eide and Yokota completed the expanded paper in 2003, the Sub-Commission asked them to prepare a second working paper, this time to focus on ‘legal, judicial, administrative and educational measures taken by the Governments concerned’ and develop a set of proposed principles and guidelines for all relevant actors, taking full account of CERD’s recently published ‘General Recommendation 29 on descent-based discrimination’.[85] With both papers finished, the Sub-Commission then recommended that the UN Human Rights Council (hereafter, HRC) mandate Eide and Yokota, as the first Special Rapporteurs on Discrimination Based on Work and Descent, to submit a final report to the 58th session of the Sub-Commission.[86] The recommendation was adopted without a vote and the resulting report was submitted to the Office of the High Commissioner on Human Rights (hereafter, OHCHR) in June 2007.

It was two years later in March 2009 when the HRC agreed, with India voting against, to publish the Special Rapporteurs’ final report.[87] Released for the 11th session of the HRC in June 2009, the report includes as an annex the ‘Draft principles and guidelines for the effective elimination of discrimination based on work and descent’, which refers to ICERD, CERD’s General Recommendation No. 29, the Durban Declaration, the 2005 World Conference, International Labour Organization Convention No. 111, the UNESCO Convention on Cultural Diversity, the UNESCO Convention on Discrimination in Education, and the United Nations Global Compact.[88] The draft principles follow CERD’s General Recommendation No. 29 but also clearly include “caste”.[89] The principles refer to a number of applicable rights,[90] and cover both de facto and de jure discrimination. They call for governments to protect, investigate and prosecute, and create special measures for affirmative provisions, equal opportunities in work, and access to justice, education, health, food, water and shelter. Special mention is made to women and children as affected by multiple levels of discrimination, and governments are required to ‘eliminate’ discriminatory customs.

Following publication of the draft principles, UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, Navi Pillay, called for the eradication of the ‘shameful concept of caste’ and the promotion of the principles.[91] The OHCHR Strategic Plan 2010-11 also outlined ‘Countering discrimination, with a particular focus on women and caste’ as a key thematic priority.[92] UN Special Rapporteur on Contemporary Forms of Racism, Githu Muigai, called for states to ‘engage in substantive discussions’ on caste-based discrimination and recognise the principles, and Independent Expert on Minority Issues, Gay McDougall, welcomed and called for further discussion on the principles too.[93] On 20 April 2011, Deputy High Commissioner for Human Rights, Kyung-wha Kang, while in Nepal reiterated that, ‘Protecting the rights of those historically discriminated on the basis of caste will continue to be a priority for our Office in Nepal, as well as OHCHR at large. The High Commissioner has made it her personal commitment to advancing these issues in public statements and writings.’[94] However, as yet they remain in draft form.

What more can be done?

In formulating a strategy to prevent caste-based discrimination and support equality for Dalits, a number of immediate actions are necessary.

Action 1: Enact a national law

In Pravin Kumar Mahato vs. Government of Nepal,[95] the Supreme Court of Nepal issued a mandamus directive order to the government to pass within a year a comprehensive law to enact the constitutional pledge to prohibit caste-based discrimination and create special provisions for Dalits. The government has since reported this obligation to CERD, although it remains unfulfilled:

‘The Court has clearly stipulated or pronounced that the constitutional expectation against untouchability is to formulate law with compensatory provision, making it punishable. The existing punitive provision under the Country Code, 1963 is not sufficient as per the constitutional spirit. (Government of Nepal 2007, para.138)

The government has equally assured CERD that in response to its previous review, it has undertaken to ensure that the NDC becomes a statutory, independent and fully-funded organ of the state:

‘A bill designed to provide statutory status to the NDC has been drafted for introduction in the Legislature-Parliament. (Government of Nepal 2007, para.134)

As such, the government submitted in July 2009 a draft bill to the Constituent Assembly titled the ‘Caste-based Discrimination and Untouchability Crime (Elimination and Punishment) Act’. The bill has been reviewed by a number of organisations, including the NDC and OHCHR, and provides for the penalisation of caste-based discrimination and “untouchability” in access to public places and facilities, provision of goods and services, and employment.[96] The bill also criminalises incitement to discrimination, provides for compensation, and brings increased punishments for public officials discriminating in their work. On a procedural level, the bill allows for civil society organisations to assist in bringing cases, and ensures police and prosecutors treat cases in confidentiality.

Unfortunately however, the bill has a large number of important weaknesses. According to the NDC and OHCHR report, the bill fails to sufficiently codify international legal commitments. The bill prolongs the Muluki Ain flaw of failing to define caste-based discrimination and “untouchability”, which, as has been established earlier, has been a significant cause in the failure of prosecutions. Similarly the bill fails to identify or list acts considered to be discriminatory, or classify levels of seriousness, or provide for a proportionate range of punishments that can be applied according to the severity of the act. The NDC and OHCHR report also urges the government to ensure that the necessary responsibilities and procedures required by the police and prosecution to promptly and successfully bring cases to court are included, and that the police are accessible, responsive to and protective of complainants. The report rightly suggests that, bearing in mind the context of Nepal, additional provisions be included to allow for the geographical distance and the potential expense for complainants, and ensure that the police and judiciary speak in a language that is easily understood.

NGOs should campaign to hold the government to account, both to provide an effective law on caste-based discrimination, and an effective statutory body to work on behalf of Dalits. The priority of such a campaign would be upon the judicial executive pillars, working to support judges to better follow up on their decisions, while pressuring the government and senior officials to implement such orders. Additional work could be done to lobby the legislature to reject, redraft and improve the bill.

Action 2: Prosecute

As has been established earlier, one of the primary motivations for the continuation of caste-based discrimination is a lack of implementation of laws, including the successful prosecution of perpetrators. Although widespread prosecutions should be a medium term objective for the government, in the short term, in order to metaphorically and publicly ‘draw a line in the sand’, the government should engage in strategic litigation. NGOs and INGOs, such as the Asian Legal Resource Centre, have already developed a list of cases that could be the basis for strategic litigation, including the aforementioned case of Muna Devi vs. Bir Bahadur and Parbati Thapa (Asian Legal Resource Centre 2003). Strategic litigation should concentrate on generating precedent in the Nepali courts, by, for example, focusing on discrimination against women or child Dalits in order to show the multiple levels of such discrimination. Other cases should include examples of senior government officials discriminating, as well as senior individuals in the private sector and in the police. Cases should alternately include violent assault, sexual assault, torture, kidnapping, denial of access to communal facilities, and prohibition on the basis of religious or customary practices. Such cases should also establish precedents for both criminal remedies, such as imprisonment and fines, and civil remedies, such as compensation.

Action 3: Fulfil CERD’s recommendations

CERD has made a number of recommendations to Nepal that remain to be implemented. NGOs should focus their national campaigning on raising awareness of the government’s responsibility to implement such recommendations, and lobby the government to do so. The recommendations to be emphasised by NGOs include: firstly, CERD repeatedly highlighted that the government of Nepal has failed to publish (and probably collect) enough disaggregated data, including data on both violations and enforcement.[97] Such data could be used by the government both to track the occurrence of caste-based discrimination, and therefore better understand it, and provide a basis for programmatic and policy implementation and prioritisation. Secondly, Nepal’s representations to CERD seem to imply that the government fails to understand properly or keep track of its own legislation, legal mechanisms or enforcement.[98] Thirdly, while Nepal has consistently prioritised policies on awareness-raising and educational programmes, CERD has called on the government to place more emphasis on ‘enforceable rights-based action’,[99] and promoting awareness within the actual organs of the state that are prolonging caste-based discrimination, in particular the judiciary, teachers and the police.[100] Fourthly, CERD has reiterated that Nepal should strengthen the National Human Rights Commission and NDC, making them statutory, independent, effective, national and properly budgeted for,[101] and introduce special measures for Dalits to be represented more within the media.[102] Finally, the government should respond urgently to CERD’s request for Nepal’s 17th, 18th and 19th periodic reports, which were due three years ago, on 1 March 2008.[103]

Action 4: Improve the international mechanisms

The fourth and final action should be the main focus of INGOs: improvement of the international mechanisms to prevent and punish caste-based discrimination, and those states that intentionally or otherwise perpetuate such discrimination. As has been established, despite the creation of draft principles on discrimination based on work and descent, they have not as yet been adopted. INGOs should concentrate on mobilising friendly member states, other related UN mechanisms, such as the special rapporteur on contemporary forms of racism, racial discrimination, xenophobia and related intolerance, and the OHCHR to pressure the General Assembly to adopt the principles and create a permanent special rapporteur. Once adopted, the broad nature of the principles would require their integration into other treaty bodies, such as CmAT, CmEDAW and CmRC, amongst others. A broad based usage of the principles, together with greater research on caste-based discrimination, perhaps along the lines of UN High Commissioner Pillay’s suggestion of an ‘observatory on discrimination’, could result in wider awareness among the media, research institutions, private enterprise, as well as other INGOs and NGOs.

Conclusion

The issue of caste-based discrimination against Dalits is of great importance in the 21st century, and remains one of the last customary bastions of discrimination, resulting in a mixture of both short term atrocities and long term effects on levels of education, health and access to employment. Despite attempts by visionary leaders such as Gandhi and Ambedkar from the early 20th century onwards, with the exception of small gains in urban areas and amongst the educated, little seems to have changed. The 1990s growth in NGOs across South Asia, particularly in newly democratised Nepal, together with the latter’s opportunity to create new constitutional and legal standards that could act as inspiration for the much larger neighbouring state of India, have made some changes. CERD has been of significant importance to the movement; with a fairly progressive procedural setup, CERD has been able to raise the issues faced by Dalits from being grounded in the rights of minorities, to one that is grounded in racial discrimination, and therefore a matter of jus cogens according to Rehman (Rehman 2009, p.431). There remains much to be done, both by governmental and non-governmental entities, although the most impactful action as has been established would be the development and implementation of an accessible, responsive and progressive legal system.

Appendix 1: status of ratifications by Nepal

Treaty Date ratified/ acceded to
Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide. 9 December 1948International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination. 7 March 1966Amendment to article 8 of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination. 15 January 1992

International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights.    16 December 1966

Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. 10 December 2008

International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.    16 December 1966

Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.    16 December 1966

Convention on the non-applicability of statutory limitations to war crimes and crimes against humanity. 26 November 1968

International Convention on the Suppression and Punishment of the Crime of Apartheid.    30 November 1973

Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women.    18 December 1979

Amendment to article 20, paragraph 1 of the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women.    22 December 1995

Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women.    6 October 1999

Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment.    10 December 1984

Amendments to articles 17 (7) and 18 (5) of the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment .    8 September 1992

Optional Protocol to the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment.    18 December 2002

International Convention against Apartheid in Sports.    10 December 1985

Convention on the Rights of the Child.    20 November 1989

Amendment to article 43 (2) of the Convention on the Rights of the Child.    12 December 1995

Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the involvement of children in armed conflict.    25 May 2000

Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the sale of children, child prostitution and child pornography.    25 May 2000

Second Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, aiming at the abolition of the death penalty.    15 December 1989

International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of their Families.    18 December 1990

Agreement establishing the Fund for the Development of the Indigenous Peoples of Latin America and the Caribbean.   Madrid, 24 July 1992

Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities.    13 December 2006

Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities.    13 December 2006

International Convention for the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance.    20 December 2006

17 Jan 1969

30 Jan 1971-14 May 1991-
14 May 1991

14 May 1991


12 Jul 1977

22 Apr 1991


15 Jun 2007

14 May 1991



1 Mar 1989

14 Sep 1990


3 Jan 2007

20 Jan 2006

4 Mar 1998



7 May 2010

7 May 2010

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[1] See for example Galanter, M. (1968). Changing Legal Conceptions of Caste. Structure and change in Indian society. M. Singer. Chicago, Aldine: 299-336.

[2] There are four Varna in the Vedas, a religious text for Hindus, not to be confused with a monistic text like the Christian Bible.

[3] Manusmṙti should be translated from Sanskrit as ‘Manu’s memories’ rather than ‘the law according to Manu’ as is often cited. Ambedkar, an “untouchable”, Chairman of the Drafting Committee of the Indian Constitution, and founder of the Indian reservations system, famously burned a copy of Manusmṙti in 1927 to protest at the manner in which it symbolised injustice towards “untouchables”. Ambedkar wrote: ‘As for myself, I do not feel puzzled by the origin of caste in India for, as I have established before, endogamy is the only characteristic of caste and when I say origin of caste I mean the origin of the mechanism for endogamy’ Ambedkar, B. (2002). Castes in India, their origin, mechanism and development. The essential writings of BR Ambedkar. V. Rodrigues. Oxford, Oxford University Press.

[4] It is often for example ignored that there is a hierarchy of jati regarded as avarna, or put differently, a system of internal discriminate within those regarded as Dalits.

[5] Art. 13: Right to Equality (1) All citizens shall be equal before the law. No person shall be denied the equal protection of the laws. (2) There shall be no discrimination against any citizen in the application of general laws on grounds of religion, race, gender, caste, tribe, origin, language or ideological conviction or any of these.

[6] Art. 14: Right against untouchability and racial discrimination (1) No person shall, on the ground of caste, descent, community or occupation, be subject to racial discrimination and untouchability in any form.  Such a discriminatory act shall be liable to punishment and the victim shall be entitled to compensation as provided by the law. (2) No person shall, on the ground of caste or tribe, be deprived of the use of services, conveniences or utilities available to the public, or be denied access to any public place, or public religious places, or be prevented from performing any religious act.(3) No person belonging to any particular caste or tribe shall, in relation to the production or making available of any goods, services or conveniences, be prevented from purchasing or acquiring such goods, services or conveniences; and no such goods, services or conveniences shall be sold or distributed only to members of a particular caste or tribe.(4) No one shall be allowed to purport to demonstrate superiority or inferiority of any person or a group of persons belonging to any caste, tribe or origin; or to justify social discrimination on the basis of caste and tribe; or to disseminate ideas based on caste superiority or hatred; or to encourage caste discrimination in any form.(5) Any act contrary to the provisions of clauses (2), (3) and (4) shall be punishable in accordance with law.

[7] Art. 21, 138(1), 154

[8] Art. 29

[9] Art. 33(d1)

[10] Art. 33(n)

[11] Art. 35(10)

[12] Art. 35(14)

[13] Art. 34(4)

[14] Art. 34(5)

[15] Art. 142(4)

[16] Art. 142(3)

[17] Art. 63(4)

[18] Art. 154. Formation of Commissions: The Government of Nepal may form necessary commissions to safeguard and promote the rights and interests of different sectors of the country including women, Dalits, indigenous ethnic groups [Adivasi Janajati], Madhesi, disabled, labourers or farmers. The provisions for the formation, functions, duties and powers of such commissions shall be as determined by the law.

[20] Census Bureau (2007). “Nepal in Figures.” Retrieved 01/05/2011. Many Dalits place the real number as between 20 to 25 per cent, but claim that the government has either changed the figures or have failed to properly count Dalits UNDP (2008). The Dalits of Nepal and a New Constitution: A Resource on the Situation of Dalits in Nepal, their Demands and the Implications for a new Constitution. Kathmandu, UNDP.

[21] Census Bureau (2007). “Nepal in Figures.” Retrieved 01/05/2011.

[22] Acharya, S. (2007). Social Inclusion: Gender and Equity in Educational SWAPs in South Asia Nepal Case Study. Kathmandu, UNICEF.

[23] NESAC (1998). Nepal Human Development Report. Kathmandu, NESAC.

[24] UNDP (2008). The Dalits of Nepal and a New Constitution: A Resource on the Situation of Dalits in Nepal, their Demands and the Implications for a new Constitution. Kathmandu, UNDP.

[25] There remain many other sources of international law that apply to Dalits that this essay cannot cover, including customary international law, and non-treaty sources within the Human Rights Council, such as the Universal Periodic Review. For more information, see: Smith, KM (2010), Textbook on International Human Rights, Oxford, Oxford University Press.

[26] For more information on international law and in particular how treaties bind state parties, see: Steiner, Alston & Goodman (2008), International human rights in context, Oxford, Oxford University Press

[27] The Treaty Act situates the Nepali legal system as monist, or a civil law system, but many academics within the country argue that Nepal actually has a dualist, common law system, which would require national laws to be enacted to make international treaties applicable domestically, and that the Act is some kind of legal aberration: ‘The International Covenant on ESCR and other international treaties have an unclear status in Nepal’s legal order. Nepal’s constitutional history and legislative practice suggest a dualist legal system while the Treaty Act of 1991 sees that international legal instruments prevail over the Constitution and laws.’ FIAN International and Rights and Democracy (2007). Parallel Information, The Right to Adequate Food in Nepal Geneva, OHCHR.  The judiciary however err on the side of caution and appear to regard international treaties as applicable within the courts.

[28] ICERD Art. 1(1): ‘In this Convention, the term “racial discrimination” shall mean any distinction, exclusion, restriction or preference based on race, colour, descent, or national or ethnic origin which has the purpose or effect of nullifying or impairing the recognition, enjoyment or exercise, on an equal footing, of human rights and fundamental freedoms in the political, economic, social, cultural or any other field of public life.

[29] ICERD Art. 1(4) and 2(2)

[30] ICCPR Art. 20(2)

[31] ICCPR Art. 19

[32] CERD (2003). State report, 15th and 16th periodic reports of Nepal. New York, UN. p.8

[33] ICERD Art. 1(2)

[34] CERD (2004). General Recommendation No. 30: Discrimination against non-citizens. New York, CERD.  para. 13 Art. 1(1) and 5(e)

[35] ICCPR Art. 2(1) and 26

[36] ICCPR Art. 2(1)

[37] ICCPR Art. 6

[38] ICCPR Art. 7

[39] ICCPR Art. 8

[40] ICCPR Art. 9

[41] ICCPR Art. 17

[42] ICCPR Art. 20

[43] ICCPR Art. 14 and 15

[44] ICESCR Art. 2(2) and 3

[45] CESCR (1999). General Comment No.12: the right to adequate food. New York, CESCR.

[46] ICESCR Art. 6

[47] ICESCR Art. 7

[48] ICESCR Art 12(1)

[49] CAT Art. 1(1)

[50] CAT Art. 2(1) and 16(1)

[51] CAT Art. 4

[52] CAT Art. 12

[53] CAT Art. 4(1)

[54] CmAT (2007). General Comment No.2: Implementation of article 2 by States parties. New York, CmAT. para. 21

[55] CEDAW Art. 1

[56] CEDAW Art. 5

[57] CRC Art. 2(1) and 2(2)

[58] CRC Art. 32(1)

[59] CESCR (2009). General Comment No.20: Non-Discrimination in Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. Geneva, CESCR. para. 7: ‘Guarantees of non-discrimination and equality in international human rights treaties mandate both de facto and de jure equality. De jure (or formal) equality and de facto (or substantive) equality are different but interconnected concepts. Formal equality assumes that equality is achieved if a law or policy treats men and women in a neutral manner. Substantive equality in concerned, in addition, with the effects of laws, policies and practices and with ensuring that they do not maintain, but rather alleviate, the inference disadvantage that particular groups experience.’

[60] ICERD Art. 1; ICESCR Art. 2(2); ICCPR Art. 26

[61] CERD (1993). General recommendation No. 14: Definition of racial discrimination. New York, CERD. para. 2.

[62] ICCPR Art. 2(3)(a)

[63] ICCPR Art. 2(3)(b)

[64] ICCPR Art. 2(3)(c)

[65] CESCR (2005). General Comment No.16: The equal right of men and women to the enjoyment of all economic, social and cultural rights. Geneva, CESCR.  para. 17

[66] Ibid. para. 21

[67] At the time of writing, CERD had received 40 communications from individuals in the 53 states that have agreed that CERD can hear individual cases, 17 of which were inadmissible, and 12 of which contained no violation. The most common complaint was regarding racial discrimination within the workplace.

[68] ICERD Art. 1(1)

[69] CERD (1996). Concluding observations, 10th – 14th periodic reports of India. New York, CERD.

[70] CERD (2002). General Recommendation No. 29: Article 1, paragraph 1 of the Convention (Descent). New York, CERD.  preamble

[71] Ibid.  para. 1

[72] Ibid. para. 3

[73] Ibid.  para. 4

[74] Ibid. para. 6

[75] Ibid. paras. 11-13

[76] Ibid. paras. 14-17

[77] Ibid. paras. 18-20

[78] See, for example, India’s 1996 State Report CERD (1996). State report, 10th – 14th periodic reports of India. New York, CERD. para. 7: ‘Article 1 of the Convention includes in the definition of racial discrimination the term ―descent‖. Both castes and tribes are systems based on ―descent‖ since people are normally born into a particular caste or a particular tribe. It is obvious, however, that the use of the term ―descent‖ in the Convention clearly refers to ―race‖. Communities which fall under the definition of Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes are unique to Indian society and its historical process. As conveyed to the Committee during the presentation of India‘s last periodic report, it is, therefore, submitted that the policies of the Indian Government relating to Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes do not come under the purview of Article 1 of the Convention. As a matter of courtesy to the members of the Committee, the Government is, however, happy to provide any information that they may require on this subject.

[79] CERD (2007). Concluding observations, 15th to 19th periodic reports of India. New York, CERD.

[80] Ibid. para. 8: ‘The ACJP and the South Asian Human Rights Documentation Centre provided shadow reports/information to CERD for its examination of India‘s periodic report urging them to raise the issue of discrimination on the basis of caste. This is reportedly the first time any NGO had submitted a shadow report on caste-based discrimination to a UN treaty body. It was an auspicious move for subsequent norm entrepreneurship on caste because it pushed CERD into taking a juridical position on whether caste fell within the remit of the committee. CERD made clear that caste- based discrimination did fall within its mandate, specifically under ‘descent’ in Article 1.1. The Indian delegation firmly rejected this assessment but the dialogue positioned CERD as an early ally of advocates on caste and ICERD as a relevant international standard. Lennox, C. (2009). DALITS AND NORM ENTREPRENEURSHIP ON CASTE-BASED DISCRIMINATION. London, Institute of Commonwealth Studies, University of London.           

[81] Durban, South Africa, 31 August to 7 September 2001

[82] Sub-Commission on prevention of discrimination and protection of minorities (1998). Fiftieth session: contemporary forms of slavery. New York, UN. paras. 35-36

[83] Sub-Commission on the promotion and protection of human rights (2000). Resolution 2000/4. New York, UN. para. 4. According to discussion at the time, the addition of both ‘work’ and ‘descent’ was at the request of the Indian sub-commissioner, Soli Sorabjee, who argued that he would not support the investigation if it made any reference to caste.

[84] Sub-Commission on the promotion and protection of human rights (2002). Resolution 2002/108. New York, UN.

[85] Sub-Commission on the promotion and protection of human rights (2003). Resolution 2003/22. New York, UN. para. 7(a-c)

[86] ‘The Human Rights Council, taking note of resolution 2006/14 of24 August 2006 of the Sub-Commission on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights, affirms the mandate of the Sub-Commission’s Special Rapporteurs on discrimination based on work and descent and asks them to complete their study on this topic, including finalizing draft principles and guidelines for the effective elimination of discrimination based on work and descent, and to submit their final report in 2007 to the Sub-Commission or its successor body, or in the absence of either, to the Council. The Council also endorses the Special Rapporteurs’ proposals to organize (i) two regional workshops, one in Asia and one in Africa, before the end of the first quarter of 2007 by obtaining independent funding, in order to encourage the interactive participation of representatives of affected communities in discussions with the Special Rapporteurs on this topic; and (ii) a consultation meeting in Geneva during the second quarter of 2007 in order for the Special Rapporteurs to receive the views of Governments, United Nations bodies and agencies, non-governmental organizations and representatives of affected communities on the finalization of the draft principles and guidelines for the effective elimination of discrimination based on work and descent. The Human Rights Council requests the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights to provide adequate assistance and support to the Special Rapporteurs to enable them to complete their study, including with regard to the organization of the proposed workshops and consultation meeting.’ Sub-Commission on the promotion and protection of human rights (2006). Resolution 2006/14. New York, UN.

[87] HRC (2009). Decision 10/117: Publication of reports completed by the Subcommission

on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights. Geneva, HRC.

[88] Sub-Commission on the promotion and protection of human rights (2009). Final report of Mr. Yozo Yokota and Ms. Chin-Sung Chung, Special Rapporteurs on the topic of discrimination based on work and descent. New York, UN.

[89] Ibid. para. 2

[90] Para. 7 includes: the right to physical security and life and the right to be free from violence; the right to equal political participation; the right to fair access to justice;  the right to own land;  the right to equal access to public and social services;  the right to freedom of religion;  the right to marriage on free will  the right to education;  the right to cultural identity;  the right to equal opportunity and free choice of employment;  the right to equal, just and favourable conditions of work;  the right to be free from forced or bonded labour;  the right to be free from cruel, inhumane or degrading treatment;  the right to health;  the right to adequate food, water, sanitation, clothing and housing.

[91] Pillay, N. (2009). “Tearing down the wall of caste.” Retrieved 01/05/2011.

[92] OHCHR (2009). Strategic Management Plan 2010-2011. Geneva, OHCHR. p.101

[93] 64th session of the UN General Assembly, October 2009

[95] Supreme Court of Nepal (2005), Pravin Kumar Mahato vs. Government of Nepal, Writ No. 3061, 2061

[96] National Dalit Commission and OHCHR (2010). Speak Up… Stop Discrimination! NDC and OHCHR-Nepal Observations on the Untouchability Bil. Kathmandu, National Dalit Commission and OHCHR. p.4

[97] CERD (1999). Concluding observations, 9th to 13th periodic reports of Nepal. New Yokr, CERD. paras. 8,13,14,16,17,18,19

[98] Ibid. paras. 9 and 18. CERD (2004). Concluding observations, 15th and 16th periodic reports of Nepal. New York, UN. para. 14

[99] CERD (1999). Concluding observations, 9th to 13th periodic reports of Nepal. New Yokr, CERD. para.12

[100] Ibid. paras. 11 and 20. CERD (2004). Concluding observations, 15th and 16th periodic reports of Nepal. New York, UN. paras. 15, 18, 20

[101] CERD (2004). Concluding observations, 15th and 16th periodic reports of Nepal. New York, UN. paras. 9, 10, 11

[102] Ibid. para. 102

[103] Ibid. para. 25

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Is “Good governance” important for promoting economic development in Nepal?

Over the past decade, “good governance” has become of increasing importance to the development debate. This essay will strive to provide contextualisation for its introduction, including a brief overview of “development” and its discourse, and then proceed to offer some examination of what the term good governance denotes, differentiate good governance from preceding development trends, and finally examine some empirical evidence of the effects of good and bad governance in practice. The essay in its current confines will however only briefly touch upon or avoid altogether the much wider and significant discussions in various academic fields upon the much more exacting terms of “democracy”, “governance” and so forth.

The most effective way to define “development” is to understand what and how it is measured (or perhaps how its absence is measured). Until the 1980s, development was defined primarily by monetary advancement, with development analysts identifying levels of development according to the growth and increase of GDP and per capita GDP within a country. There are however multiple issues in defining development based on GDP alone. GDP fails to take account of the large informal sectors and non-financial trade prevalent in many countries, and, as a mean average, per capita GDP makes no adjustment for the economic inequality between people. A low GDP could indicate an immeasurable economy, and a high per capita GDP could hide a big divide between rich and poor.

With financial measurements alone proving insufficient to define and understand development, a composite index, named the Human Development Index (HDI), was created in 1990 by Mahbub ul Haq and Amartya Sen to ‘shift the focus of development economics from national income accounting to people centered policies’ (Haq 1995). The HDI was included in the United Nations Development Program’s (UNDP) Human Development Report and originally compared countries according to their life expectancy, literacy and per capita GDP. Since its launch, the report’s methodology has changed somewhat in response to changing interpretations of what development entails, to look more widely at health, “knowledge”, and living standards respectively, replacing the GDP measurement with gross national income (GNI), introduced to alter GDP according to any interest being paid (or received) to service foreign debts (UNDP 2010). The HDI has subsequently spawned a whole range of progeny for defining and measuring development, such as those based on purchasing power parity, access to development, consumption or contextualisation of poverty (Khan 1996).

Despite the HDI’s importance in defining what we understand as development, the index is restrained from tackling more recently identified and somewhat contentious factors due to its mandate to establish a broad global consensus and satisfy the requirements of a range of governments. The latest 2010 HDI report succeeds in adding inequality-adjusted and gender-inequality-adjusted indices, although neither participation, gender nor equality are included within the main index and instead have been relegated to their own separate indices, to avoid what the UNDP refers to as ‘measurement issues’ (UNDP 2010). The UNDP does however openly recognise that the HDI only offers a ‘broad proxy’ of development, and, in response to the above, and somewhat rebelliously, underlines that it ‘does not reflect political participation or gender inequalities’ (UNDP 2010).

The HDI is also criticised for only providing a macro-level narrative. More intuitive tools are now defining development according to a micro-level focus, identifying the groups within countries that are not developed or developing, and that are not obtaining the national HDI averages due to some particular characteristic, what Sen (1981) refers to as a process of indentifying those that are not developed and then aggregating their similarities. This method of breaking down levels of development according to those groups which cannot attain it is in contrast to the Keynesian tenet of top-down government intervention and the macro-level definition of “giving” development. The bottom-up and equitable approach to development inevitably intensifies further questions of whether services and support provided by the government and other sources are reaching the right places in an efficient and targeted manner, or whether the reason why they failed to reach the right place is because either those delivering such services and support did not comprehensively understand the local development needs and context, and could not make the right decisions accordingly, or they themselves are impeding development. Such uncertainty poses a further question: is a comparative lack of development in some places partly the result of bad governance?

The manner in which states, and the governments that manage them, have tried to tackle the comparative lack of development has largely been determined according to wider global and regional influences and trends. Strategies for developing have included Keynesian “modernisation” and import-substituting industrialisation in the 1950s; export expansion, agricultural “green” revolutions and population control in the 1960s; contextualisation, rejection of GDP growth in favour of pro-poor distribution, and trade liberalisation in the 1970s; and democratisation in the 1980s (Khan 1996). The Overseas Development Institute (ODI) summarises such trends according to global shifts in development thinking and emphasis as demonstrated in Table 1.

Table 1 (Hyden and Court 2002)

Focus Emphasis
1950s-60s Projects For the people
1960s-70s Programmes Of the people
1970s-80s Policies With the people
1990s-present Politics By the people

Success or failure in each of these trends is now widely agreed to be, to a significant extent, dependent upon the quality of the decision-making, policy creation and implementation ability of the government and state institutions. Whilst not wishing to delve too deeply into the various debates as to the exact meaning of governance,[1] for the purposes of this essay, we shall be primarily interested in governance in its broadest sense of rule-maker and rule-implementer, and consequently its ability to be either a facilitator or an impeder to development (Khan 1996, p.29).

Streeten’s polar opposite description is useful to understand what we mean by the facilitator or impeder government, and as a result discover what can be regarded as good and bad governance. He compares the differences between an idealistic, competent and informed government creating policy and implementing programmes above personal interest or conflict and promoting the common good overall, against a corrupt and inefficient predatory government making ill-informed decisions, maximising individual profit and undermining development at every opportunity (Streeten 1994). The earliest link established at the inter-governmental level between such good and bad governance and its effect on development is the World Bank’s 1989 report Sub-Saharan Africa: From Crisis To Sustainable Development which established that good governance was a vital factor in development, and that Sub-Saharan Africa had faired comparatively poorly in developing due partly to its bad governance. Following the aforementioned trend in advocating democratisation as the solution to development, no doubt partly causing what Huntington (1991) describes as the ‘third wave of democratisation’, this new trend of “good governance” began to emerge in the 1990s to explain why democratisation had not lived up to its developmental promises in some places (Abrahamsen 2000). Proponents of democratisation as a catalyst for development underlined that in many places, states had been wrongly characterised as having democratised after having held elections, but had not established alongside universal suffrage the development-inducing factors of advanced democracies, such as participation in decision making or accountability. Instead, they argued, in many places what resulted was the continuation of what Ayoade refers to as ‘states without citizens’, where people have so little trust or expectation in their elected government, they tend to ‘do it themselves’ (Ayoade 1988).

The new good governance trend built upon the democratisation advocates’ belief that the quality of governance by the government and state institutions could catalyse development. Brinkerhoff adds to Streeten’s description of good governance by summarising that good governance is the successful management of competing interests for the common good while incorporating and integrating effectiveness, legitimacy and security (2007). Khan expands our understanding by detailing the three resultant procedural aspects of good governance, and, in particular, the ensuing relationship between people and government policy and implementation (1996, p.28). They include:

(i)         the ability of citizens to express views and access decision making freely;

(ii)        the capacity of the government agencies (both political and bureaucratic) to translate these views into realistic plans and to implement them cost-effectively; and

(iii)      the ability of citizens and institutions to compare what has been asked for with what has been planned, and to compare what has been planned with what has been implemented.

These aspects also highlight one key relationship change in the good governance trend: the movement from a needs-based approach to development to a rights-based one, where people are entitled to a government that responds to their needs and where people are not deprived, but rather lack opportunity to develop. Alongside this changed relationship is the resultant establishment of clear norms and international standards of governance, and the obligation to have a strong civil society, including an independent media, in order to create checks and balances and provide for accountability. The new relationship relies upon good institutional design and broad areas of traditional political engineering (Robinson and White 1998, p.33).

The United Kingdom’s Department for International Development (DfID), a major partner in development projects, has expanded the necessary factors of good governance in a 2006 White Paper, Making governance work for the poor, creating the ‘Capability, Accountability and Responsiveness Framework’,[2] which aspires to create a ‘common language’ for good governance by describing the behaviour, relationships and organisational attributes required (Moore and Teskey 2006). The Overseas Development Institute (ODI) has expanded the White Paper in Table 3 below.

Table 3 (Court 2006)

 

Assessments of good governance are today also carried out by a variety of actors, inter-governmental, non-governmental, academic and corporate, including the World Bank Institute, the World Bank, Transparency International, the Economist Intelligence Unit, Global Integrity and the aforementioned ODI.

This is not to say that good governance is a commonly agreed doctrine in itself. Indeed, with so many different donors, inter-governmental institutions, non-governmental organisations and academics all defining and measuring, there is evidently a wide and sometimes conflicting disagreement as to the criteria and form of good governance, all of which proves problematic to those governments attempting to implement changes to improve themselves and their institutions (Abrahamsen 2000). Indeed, in 2010, this author himself took part in coordinating an international conference designed to add further to the global good governance debate.[3]

Some argue that the absence of an agreed definition of good governance is due to it being smoke and mirrors, democratisation in all but name, and a continuation of the hypothesis of Halperin, Siegle and Weinstein, which maintains that countries with democratic governments develop quicker and more sustainably that those without (Halperin, Siegle et al. 2005) (Siegle, Weinstein et al. 2004). Others go further and contend that the good governance doctrine’s claims to empower, democratise and liberate are in fact the ‘stuff of dreams’ (Rist 1997) and conceal the underlying intention of certain unnamed actors to advance economic liberalisation and promote the Washington Consensus, outlined by the economist John Williamson in 1989 as an ostensible agreement to endorse and further 10 free market policies as essential elements to create development and strengthen economies, and utilised by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank, amongst others (Williamson 1989). Abrahamsen (2000, p.xii) claims that the good governance doctrine:

‘narrates governance in a manner that serves to blur the distinction between democratisation and the retreat of the state from the social and economic fields and therefore constructs a new legitimacy for economic liberalisation in the form of structural programs.

She continues:

‘Empowerment in the good governance parlance signifies merely that people should “pull their weight” and make development projects more cost efficient, and again the near fusion of democracy and economic liberalism in the good governance discourse becomes apparent.

The claim that the doctrine of good governance has many similarities with its predecessor the doctrine of democratisation (see for example the principles of good governance in Table 3), or indeed with economic liberalisation, appears true to an extent. According to research carried out by White (1998, p.25), the number of authoritarian governments that could be classed as exercising good governance are few and far between, and those that do, are in fact verging on the edge of democratisation. White also argues that in those governments that have been:

‘singularly unsuccessful in establishing a capacity for good governance and socio-economic improvement [a] change in political regime may be highly relevant as an alternative way of achieving an “effective developmental state” [and that the] central features of liberal democracies’ selection of political leaders through popular elections, open and unfettered competition for political office, and the pressures exerted by a free press and public opinion are essential mechanisms for creating a state which is responsive, efficient, and accountable.’

However, as some proponents of good governance argue, democratic countries with relatively good governance systems such as those in Latin America have been overtaken in many development measurements such as the HDI by others with similarly good governance but without or with only limited democratic institutions, such as Japan, South Korea, Singapore, Taiwan, Hong Kong, and so forth. Jeffries (1993) adds to the aforementioned countries the governments of Rawlings (president of Ghana, 1993-2001) and Museveni (president of Uganda, 1986-present) as instances of good governance without democracy, and goes on to avow that the creation of good governance is important to development far beyond the nature of its political category. Jeffries believes that democratisation is ‘relatively speaking an irrelevance’ and that a government’s primary responsibility, regardless of it being democratic or authoritarian, is to create an effective state, establish good quality institutions and build state capacity and commitment, all elements of good governance.

Khan (1996, p.2) supports Jeffries’ argument that good governance is more important for development than democratisation, stating that:

‘the varied experiences with poverty alleviation in Asia do tend to suggest that the alleviation of poverty not only requires focused planning approaches but, for these approaches to succeed, a sensitive and a committed governance is also required.

But Khan also goes on to contest Abrahamsen’s view that good governance in such countries is synonymous with economic liberalisation and the Washington Consensus’ promotion of the small state, arguing that amongst the Asian Tigers (namely Hong Kong, Singapore, South Korea and Taiwan, so-called for their rapid industrialisation between the 1960s and 1990s), the most significant universal feature was good governance and the states’ aptitude to know when it was necessary to intervene, and ability and capacity to do so. Sklar (1987, p.714) appears to find the most appropriate compromise by broadly supporting Khan and Jeffries, whilst giving some ground to Abrahamsen and White, in arguing that ‘democracy comes to every country in fragments or parts; each fragment becomes an incentive for the addition of another’. In essence, good governance is broadly more likely to be achieved in democratic states, but good governance can occur in more authoritarian situations too.

As many political scientists have argued, when people gain even limited development with greater access to education, communications and what Diamond (1989) refers to as the ‘democratic ethos’, any legitimacy for governing that is grounded in tradition, religion or custom becomes difficult to maintain and people almost naturally call for democratisation. In response, many governments have pledged to democratise and by doing so deliver development to the people. However, in some cases such new democratic governments fail to instigate good governance simultaneously due to weak institutional design (Lijphart and Waisman 1996), be it that poorly designed presidential systems have a tendency to impede representation and institutional building (O’Donnell, Schmitter et al. 1986), or that badly designed parliamentary systems can fail to create consensus or produce clear lines of accountability (Haggard and Kaufman 1994).

In newly democratising states, particularly in Africa and Latin America (Rueschemeyer, Stephens et al. 1992), good governance is often neglected in the scramble for democracy, as old elites attempt to defend their higher status and living standards at the expense of creating good quality institutions or a stable and peaceful country. Such states often have limited or repressed civil societies, state institutions that purposefully fail to represent the people equally, and systems based on clientelist or patronage. Khan (1996, p.1-3) explains such democratic states in Asia as consisting of:

‘unfavourable power relationships, insensitive government apparatus and undemocratic political structures [that] consistently disadvantage the poor and maintain simultaneously a disproportionately smaller wealthier class.

He continues:

‘not all population groups living in these countries have benefited equally from the success of their overall economic development. In fact despite economic development at the macro level in some countries, unfavourable policy environments, unequal power relationships and unequal access to state resources may actually have helped to benefit a minority at the expense of the larger community.

Furthermore, we can extract from Diamond’s political science hypotheses that the presence of democracy itself can be a hindrance to good governance. If development fails under an authoritarian government, it is the authoritarian system itself that is at fault and must be changed, whereas if development fails under a democratic government, it is the government’s fault and the government must be changed rather than the system itself, which may consequently be prolonging bad governance (Diamond 1989).

Having defined and differentiated good governance and established that democracy, while sharing many commonalities, is not one and the same, and that, in some cases, has itself undermined or at least slowed the formation of good governance, it is important to outline more clearly the evidence that good governance alone is necessary for development to occur. Khan’s case study research in Asia shows quite clearly that good governance positively influences and enables development, even more so than the presence of rich resources (1996, p.2):

‘economic development trends in Asia suggest that countries which maintain good policies with good governance have achieved better results than those which, despite a generous resource base and infrastructure, have performed relatively badly.

Khan’s research compares two geographically, politically and (initially) demographically similar countries, the Philippines and Malaysia, and contrasts the effects of their respective bad and good governance systems upon their development over four decades (see Table 4). Solely focusing on their GDP growth rate, Khan finds that Malaysia’s good governance is a key determinant to its economic success, declaring the Philippines failure to develop as being due to its highly bureaucratic, hierarchical and elitist governance structures, which overwhelmingly fail to achieve either the ability or the sensitivity to address development needs.

Table 4 (Khan 1996, p.67-115)

1965-73 1973-80 1980-90
 Philippines 5.4% 6.3% 1.1%
 Malaysia 6.7% (^24%) 7.5% (^19%) 5.2% (^473%)

We can add further to Khan’s development hypothesis by examining the comparative difference between both countries in regards to their HDI results over a similar period (see Table 5). With the exception of adult literacy levels, which the Philippines had an early lead over Malaysia, with the latter rapidly catching up, the results show Malaysia to be clearly in the lead, and, as Table 4 reflects, comparatively more stable in its increases in comparison to the Philippines.

Table 5 (UNDP 2010)

1980 1990 2000 2010
Philippines Life expectancy 61.1 65.4 69.5 71.9
Adult literacy 83.3 93.6 92.6 93.5
Income (GNI PPP) $2815 $2568 $2977 $3903
Malaysia Life expectancy 66.7 70.1 72.5 74.3
Adult literacy 69.5 82.9 88.7 92.2
Income (GNI PPP) $5109 $6889 $10218 $13737

If we then add data from the Corruption Perceptions Index, produced by the non-governmental organisation, Transparency International (see Table 6), we can see that the experienced level of corruption, established previously as an indicator of the quality of governance, is substantially higher in the Philippines as compared to Malaysia, which is almost on par with some countries in Western Europe.

Table 6 (Transparency-International 2010)

1995 2000 2005 2010
Philippines 2.77 2.8 2.5 2.4
Malaysia 5.28 4.8 5.1 4.4

More broadly, empirical research into particular components of good governance and their effect on development show widespread positive effects. A 1995 World Bank report testing the relationship between strong property rights and development concluded that ‘institutions that protect property rights are crucial to economic growth and to investment’ and in some case studies, ‘point to effects that rival even those of education’ (Knack and Keefer 1995, p.18-19). The report continues to state that so important are the institutions that protect property rights, that they affect not only growth, but also investment and the efficiency of such investment.

Other empirical research, such as a study of 152 countries carried out by La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishy (La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes et al. 1999), point to a strong positive link between development and good governance, and in particular efficient, responsive and non-corrupt interventions by government, and of significant relevance to our earlier debate, not the small government advocated by the Washington Consensus, but rather a medium size government with a large public sector collecting comparatively high levels of taxation. Their research also highlights the cyclical nature of good governance and development, the first contributing to the second, and those experiencing the second then calling further for the first. Reversely, evidence of bad governance such as inefficiency, lack of participation, poor property rights, corruption and inadequate provision of public services results in amongst other outcomes, higher child mortality, lower levels of literacy and inferior infrastructure.

Conclusion

We have explored in this essay the continually evolving target of “development” as constantly demanding the creation of new approaches and new doctrines in response (Hyden and Court 2002, p.2). The latest doctrine, “good governance” is not entirely, as Abrahamsen (2000, p.xi) would have us believe, ‘merely the latest reproduction of the “dream of development”’, or an amalgamation of economic liberalism and democratisation, although elements within its advocates do prompt a sense of déjà vu. Neither is good governance a luxury for rich countries or confined to those regions that are comparatively more developed.[4] Instead, good governance is a somewhat broad concept that combines and applies a range of values such as participation, fairness, decency, accountability, transparency and efficiency, to the manner in which governments and state institutions work. Our brief examination and comparison of the Philippines and Malaysia as examples of good and bad (or at least better and worse) governance over the past four decades is symbolic of the wide amount of empirical evidence available that suggests that the quality of governance is a necessary factor to development. While it can never be declared that good governance is the final doctrine we shall see in relation to development, it is indisputable that good governance encourages and enables people to respond to and grasp a wider and higher quality spectrum of opportunities which will ultimately result in development (Khan 1996, p.117).

Finally, in a last salute to those questioning the relevancy of the good governance doctrine, in future far more needs to be asked regarding two particular areas of good governance that were unfortunately beyond the remit of this short essay: firstly, whether or not donor aid itself obstructs good governance by removing the causal link between payment of taxation and governance, particularly in regards to accountability; and secondly, why the good governance agenda is not necessarily pursued with the same resolve and willpower within those international and donor institutions that are flying its flag.

Bibliography

Abrahamsen, R. (2000). Disciplining democracy : development discourse and good governance in Africa. London, Zed.

Ayoade, J. (1988). States without citizens. The precarious balance : state and society in Africa. D. Rothchild and N. Chazan. Boulder ; London, Westview: x,357p.

Brinkerhoff, D. W. (2007). Governance in post-conflict societies : rebuilding fragile states. London, Routledge.

Court, J. (2006). Governance and aid effectiveness: Has the White Paper got it right? . London, Overseas Development Institute.

Court, J., G. Hyden, et al. (2002). Governance performance: the aggregate picture. World Governance Survey Discussion Paper 3 New York, United Nations University.

Diamond, L. (1989). “Beyond authoritarianism and totalitarianism: strategies for democratization.” Washington Quarterly 12(1): 141-63.

Haggard, S. and R. R. Kaufman (1994). “The Challenges of Consolidation.” Journal of Democracy 5(4): 5-16.

Halperin, M. H., J. T. Siegle, et al. (2005). The democracy advantage : how democracies promote prosperity and peace. New York ; London, Routledge.

Haq, M. u. (1995). Reflections on human development : how the focus of development economics shifted from national income accounting to people-centred policies, told by one of the chief architects of the new paradigm. New York ; Oxford, Oxford University Press.

Huntington, S. P. (1991). The third wave : democratization in the late twentieth century, University of Oklahoma Press.

Hyden, G. and M. Bratton (1992). Governance and politics in Africa, Lynne Rienner Publishers.

Hyden, G. and J. Court (2002). Governance and Development. World Governance Survey Discussion Paper 1. New York, United Nations University.

Jeffries, R. (1993). “The state, structural adjustment and Good governmet in africa’.” Journal of commonwealth and comparative studies 31(1): 20-35.

Khan, M. A. (1996). Economic development, poverty alleviation and governance : the Asian experience. Aldershot, Avebury.

Knack, S. and P. Keefer (1995). Institutions and Economic Performance: Cross-Country Tests Using Alternative Institutional Indicators. Washington DC, World Bank.

La Porta, R., F. Lopez-de-Silanes, et al. (1999). The Quality of Government. NBER Working Paper Series No 6727. Cambridge, Mass, National Bureau of Economic Research.

Lijphart, A. and C. H. Waisman (1996). Institutional design in new democracies : Eastern Europe and Latin America. Boulder, Colo. ; Oxford, Westview Press.

March, J. G. and J. P. Olsen (1995). Democratic governance. New York, Free Press.

Moore, M. and G. Teskey (2006). The CAR Framework: Capability, Accountability, Responsiveness. What Do These Terms Mean, Individually and Collectively? A Discussion Note for DFID Governance and Conflict Advisers. London, Institute of Development Studies.

O’Donnell, G. A., P. C. Schmitter, et al. (1986). Transitions from authoritarian rule : Conference : Papers. Baltimore, Johns Hopkins University Press.

Rist, G. (1997). The history of development : from western origins to global faith. London, Zed Books.

Robinson, M. and G. White (1998). The democratic developmental state : politics and institutional design. Oxford, Oxford University Press.

Rueschemeyer, D., E. H. Stephens, et al. (1992). Capitalist development and democracy. Cambridge, Polity.

Sen, A. (1981). Poverty and famines : an essay on entitlement and deprivation. Oxford, Clarendon, 1982.

Siegle, J. T., M. M. Weinstein, et al. (2004). “Why democracies excel.” Foreign Affairs 83(5): 57-71.

Sklar, R. L. (1987). “Developmental Democracy.” Comparative studies in society and history 29(1): 714.

Streeten, P. (1994). Strategies for human development : global poverty and unemployment. Copenhagen, Handelshøjskolens Forlag.

Transparency-International (2010). Corruption Perception Index. Berlin, Transparency International.

UNDP (2010). Human Development Report. New York, United Nations Development Program.

Williamson, J. (1989). Latin American Readjustment: How Much has Happened. Washington DC, Institute for International Economics.

Footnotes

 

[1] For more on the governance debate, see Hyden, G. and M. Bratton (1992). Governance and politics in Africa, Lynne Rienner Publishers, or March, J. G. and J. P. Olsen (1995). Democratic governance. New York, Free Press.

[2] For an example of the Framework in practice, see the review of Nigeria

[3] See www.right2info-mdgs.org for details of a 2010 campaign to raise the importance of information flows, particularly via a free media, on good governance in the run up to the United Nations 2010 MDG+10 Summit in New York.

[4] See for example good governance in Tanzania, in Court, J., G. Hyden, et al. (2002). Governance performance: the aggregate picture. World Governance Survey Discussion Paper 3 New York, United Nations University.

 

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International humanitarian law for Nepali civilians

International law is a body of public, private and supranational laws that have mostly emerged from the 19th century onwards and which primarily concern the governing of conduct between states. International law binds states to observe certain agreements, but unlike national law, does not provide for the equivalent enforcement unless and until the subject state consents with such enforcement. This is due to the state being regarded as the only sovereign entity, and enforcement from outside effectively violates such state sovereignty. Within a state the government has a monopoly of force to impose law, but no such monopoly exists at the international level. Any violation of international law therefore can only be redressed in one of two ways, discord (diplomatic or conflict) or reciprocity. As an example, should State A violate a treaty with State B, the latter has the options of either conflict or reciprocating by similarly violating the treaty in its relations with the former. However, reciprocity for some violations of international law, particularly humanitarian or human rights law, would be counterproductive; should State A adopt a law that allows child labour, State B doing the same would be nonsensical. Therefore a wider range of enforcement measures has been adopted as will be discussed further.

International humanitarian law (hereafter, IHL), also known as the laws of war or armed conflict, is a body of public international law, or the law of nations, that covers jus in bello, or acceptable conduct during war.[1] As summarised by the International Committee of the Red Cross (hereafter, ICRC), an institution that is both independent from governments and at the same time explicitly referred to within intergovernmental treaties, IHL is:

‘[A] set of rules which seek, for humanitarian reasons, to limit the effects of armed conflict. It protects persons who are not or are no longer participating in the hostilities and restricts the means and methods of warfare. (ICRC 2004)

Laws regulating war are rooted in a variety of historical contexts and have a basis within most religions and philosophical belief systems. According to Greenwood, who currently sits on the bench of the International Court of Justice, regulation of the practice of warfare can be traced back as early as 5000 BCE and the Sumerian’s adoption of ‘declarations of war’ and ‘peace treaties’ (Greenwood 1995, p.12). IHL roots can thereafter be placed within Islamic, Hindu, Shinto, Buddhist, Judaic, Christian traditions. Greenwood defines the origination of IHL as we understand it today, the modern formulation of laws regulating war, as founded in the enlightenment. In particular, from the works of the French philosopher Rousseau who penned ‘The Social Contract’, which contains several principles of IHL under section IV on slavery:

‘[W]ar then is a relation, not between man and man, but between state and state, and individuals are enemies only accidentally, not as men, nor even as citizens, but as soldiers; not as members of their country, but as its defenders […] The object of the war being the destruction of the hostile state, the other side has a right to kill its defenders while they are bearing arms; but as soon as they lay them down and surrender they become once more merely men, whose life no one has any right to take. (Rousseau 1898)

Others trace the contemporary form of IHL back to Henry Dunant’s recommendation to found national humanitarian societies working under a common emblem and regulated under an international treaty. In his 1862 book, ‘A Memory of Solferino’, Dunant states:

‘On certain special occasions, as, for example, when princes of the military art belonging to different nationalities meet […] would it not be desirable that they should take advantage of this sort of congress to formulate some international principle, sanctioned by a Convention and inviolate in character, which, once agreed upon and ratified, might constitute the basis for societies for the relief of the wounded in the different European countries? (Dunant 1986, p.126)

Today, the main sources of IHL can be divided into two separate and distinct areas. The first, positive law, which includes various international treaties and conventions, first came about following the end of the Crimean War in 1856 with the codification and adoption by 55 states of the ‘Paris Declaration Respecting Maritime Law’, abolishing the practice of privateering. Today, positive IHL can be considered to consist primarily of two jus in bello branches of codified law, the Hague Conventions, treaties that regulate ‘belligerents in the conduct of operations and limits the choice of means in doing harm’, and the Geneva Conventions, most applicable to this essay, which govern the treatment and protection of combatants and non-combatants, or the “principle of humanity” (Pictet 1985, p.2). There are now four Geneva Conventions (hereafter, GC)[2] and three optional additional Protocols (hereafter, AP).[3] Nearly all states, with the exception of Nauru, have ratified or acceded to the four GCs, but not all states have agreed to the APs, with 170, 165 and 54 states ratified or acceded respectively.

The second distinct area of IHL is common or customary law, which includes a vast historical body of case law and judicial decisions, the most recent and relevant of which have come from a series of international courts or tribunals over the past 15 years. Customary international law is important, despite the absence of any uniform agreement to what it includes, as in many states, such as the UK, international treaties do not form part of national legislation, but courts can apply international customary law (Greenwood 1995, p.124). Much customary IHL prior to 1949 was agreed and codified into positive law in the GCs and Hague Conventions, and since the mid-twentieth century a series of smaller treaties have been adopted that have either regulated certain weapons, such as the Ottawa Treaty, which bans anti-personnel mines, or regulated certain actors, such as the Convention on the Rights of the Child. Other as yet uncodified customary law created since the GCs is of significant importance to the evolution of IHL, and recognising such, the 1993 ‘International Conference for the Protection of War Victims’ convened a panel of experts from governments and international organisations to prepare a list of broadly accepted customary laws. The resulting publication, ‘The Study on Customary IHL’ (hereafter, the Customary Rules), took 10 years to produce by the GC-mandated ICRC and was published in 2005 to wide interest (Henckaerts 2005). [4]

Over the past 20 years, customary IHL has been enlarged due to a series of cases within newly founded courts and tribunals of an international nature. The first of such, the international Nuremburg and Tokyo tribunals, handed down a series of judgements between 1945-8, and formed a substantial basis for the GCs and for the UN General Assembly’s recognition of the need for a permanent international court. After a gap of 45 years, the next attempt, the ad hoc International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (hereafter, ICTY) was established in 1993 as a body of the UN, established to prosecute individual perpetrators for crimes under IHL. Since 1993, several tribunals have been created at the request of states with post-conflict governments, including the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia, the Special Tribunal of Lebanon, the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (hereafter, ICTR), and the Special Court for Sierra Leone. Following years of negotiations, a UN conference also finalised in 1998 the Rome Statute, establishing after ratification in 2002 the permanent International Criminal Court (hereafter, ICC). 114 countries have today ratified or acceded to the binding treaty, and the ICC is investigating or examining 17 situations, and has indicted 23 persons.

Protection for civilians

IHL has partly emerged to reduce the tenet that since time immemorial civilians have been victims of armed conflict. In recent years however, multiple sources have claimed that the numbers of civilians wronged in armed conflict has significantly increased. The respected INGO, Oxfam, advises of a general trend:

‘During World War One, an average of one in every ten casualties was a civilian. A century later, contravening the most basic principles of warfare, civilians account for the vast majority of casualties, and possibly fatalities, in situations of armed conflict. (Oxfam 2011)

Sussex University academic, Kaldor, establishes more specific statistics:

‘At the turn of the twentieth century, the ratio of military to civilian casualties in wars was 8:1. Today, this has been almost exactly reversed; in the ward of the 1990s, the ratio of military to civilian causalities is approximately 1:8. (Kaldor 1999, p.8)

Similar numbers are recognised by governments. The European Union Security Strategy states: ‘Since 1990, almost 4 million people have died in wars, 90% of them civilians’ (EU 2003, p.2). A number of academics however refute this, arguing that such statements are either based on distorted or hard to obtain statistics (Leitenberg 2006), are falsely defining ‘civilians’, or are simply creating mean averages that include conflicts which distort the figures (Roberts 2010). A more realistic average figure therefore may be somewhere between 75 and 90 per cent of total casualties in armed conflicts (Martin 2003).

Dispassionate headcounts aside, it would be hard to deny that, despite efforts, the number of civilians affected by conflict remains high. The same sources claim that this is worryingly for strategic reasons:

‘Behaviour that was proscribed according to the classical rules of warfare and codified in the laws of war in the late nineteenth century and early twentieth century, such as atrocities against non-combatants, sieges, destruction of historic monuments, etc., now constitutes an essential component of the strategies of the new mode of warfare. (Kaldor 1999, p8)

‘Civilian population displacement and casualties have increasingly become the purpose rather than a by-product of war. (Martin 2003, p227)

‘Civilians suffer as a result of indiscriminate attacks and, in many cases, are deliberately targeted […] In insurgency and counter-insurgency contexts, civilians have become part of military strategy used by anti-government and pro-government forces alike. (Oxfam 2011)

Unlike other types of law, such as human rights law, IHL does not treat all people as equals and does not provide for a uniform set of rights or duties. Instead, it differentiates between categories. In IHL, ‘combatant’ and ‘civilian’ are regarded as different categories, each with a legal primary status. ‘Civilians’ are all those defined by what they are not: combatants, as defined under the 1874 Brussels Declaration,[5] the Hague Conventions,[6] GC3,[7] and AP1.[8] Civilians are ‘protected persons’ afforded privileged status with all associated protections, until and unless they become a direct participant in the fighting,[9] whereupon they are no longer given civilian status and instead become ‘unlawful combatants’ and may be charged under criminal law (Ipsen 1995; Green 2000, p.105). Gasser divides the IHL protections provided for civilians into those that are based on the GCs, which protect persons that are under the control of an adversary against violent or arbitrary acts, and those based on the Hague Conventions, which protect civilians from the effects of military operations (Gasser 1995, p.209). The primary protection for civilians is covered under Section III of GC4,[10] and civilian property is also protected under the Hague Convention.[11]

In addition to positive law, customary IHL also provides protection for civilians. In the aforementioned Customary Rules, several apply to civilians unless and until such time as they take part in fighting.[12] Customary Rules cover indiscriminate attacks or attacks that create excessive loss,[13] attacks specifically on civilians[14] and civilian objects,[15] acts that spread terror among civilians,[16] that create starvation[17] or that undermine objects vital for the civilian population.[18] Customary Rules also provide for a state’s duty of care over civilians and civilian objects,[19] and their lives,[20] without prejudice[21] or cruelty.[22] Should civilians be interned, Customary Rules require the provision of adequate food, water, clothing, medial attention and shelter.[23] Additional protection and respect beyond that available for civilians is also accorded to persons with special characteristics such as the wounded, the sick, the infirm, pregnant women and children.[24]

Such protections can be organised into a set of principles. The primary one here is the principle of distinction, which requires parties to an armed conflict to distinguish between those people and objects that are civilian in nature, and those that are military (Sassoli 2003). During an armed conflict only those that are defined as military objectives can be the subjects of attack. This does not mean that civilians will not suffer from such an attack, but rather that they cannot be the reasoning. Any civilian object, with the exception of those benefiting from special protection such as dams, dikes and hospitals, can become a military object however, simply by producing, according to their ‘nature, location, purpose or use’, an ‘effective’ contribution to military action, or by there being a definite military advantage from its destruction.[25] This brings us to the second, the principle of proportionality, which requires any attack not to create excessive impact on civilians or civilian objects as compared to the military advantage gained for such an attack.[26] The third principle is that of necessity, which requires a degree and kind of force only to be used that is needed in order achieve an objective at the earliest possible moment and with the minimum expenditure of life and resources (Carnahan 1998, p.230).[27] The fourth relevant principle is that of unnecessary suffering, which covers the use of means or methods that are seen to cause unnecessary human suffering, such as nuclear, chemical or biological weapons.[28]

Conflict in Nepal

The conceptual foundations of IHL have real grounds in Nepal’s own historical context. The 800 BCE religious epic, the Mahabharata was partly located within the borders of modern-day Nepal, and the section covering the Kurukshetra War, regarded by some historians as having taken place between 600 and 500 BCE, outlines the Dharmayuddha, or code of conduct for righteous warfare (Singh 1984, p.531). The Dharmayuddha provides the basis for some modern IHL, prohibiting as it does the killing or degrading treatment of surrendered combatants, and banning any attack on civilians, with special additional protections for women.

The Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist) (hereafter, the Maoists) announced the commencement of a “people’s war” in February 1996, establishing an armed conflict between themselves, an insurgent movement, and the state, a High Contracting Party to the GCs. Professor of Himalayan Studies at SOAS, Hutt locates the origins of the armed conflict in his opening chapter:

‘There are many other contrasts and contradictions that do not figure in tourist literature [of Nepal]: between the constitutional definition of Nepal as Hindu state and the presence of significant religious minorities; between its status as a multi-party democracy under a constitutional monarchy and the long term presence of a well-entrenched communist movement; between its status as a unitary state with one official state language and the presence within its borders of scores of different ethnic groups speaking dozens of different languages; between its status as one of the most aided ‘developing’ nations on earth and the impoverishment and marginalisation of a large chunk of its population; and between its reputation as a land of peace and the ruthless struggles for power that have taken place at several junctures in its history. (Hutt 2004, p.1)

There followed from 1996 a protracted armed conflict over 10 years that, for a while, placed Nepal as having the highest number of disappearances of any country in the world (Bell 2007). During the conflict the Maoists’ developed a uniformed and mostly-armed force named the People’s Liberation Army, a non-uniformed political section (the party), and a non-uniformed administrative section named the United Front. They also created ‘base areas’ across the country that were under their almost complete administrative control. According to the ICRC Commentary to GC4, in order for an armed conflict to be recognised legally as a non-international armed conflict (hereafter, NIAC), and above the threshold of a disturbance,[29] the insurgents should have the characteristics of possessing an organised military force and an authority responsible for its acts, while acting within a determinate territory, and having the means of respecting and ensuring respect for the GCs (ICRC 1949, p.35). The national army should also be mobilised against the threat. According to the well-respected INGO, Human Rights Watch, the conflict surpassed the required characteristics of a NIAC in 2001 upon the deployment of the national army:

‘The Maoist rebels have an identifiable and organized command structure, both at the national and regional level, are in de-facto control of a significant part of Nepali territory, and have repeatedly stated their willingness to abide by the Geneva Conventions. Moreover, the level of fighting between government and rebel forces has frequently been high, well above mere disturbances. This has been reflected in the Nepali government’s decision in 2001 to deploy the Royal Nepali Army against the Maoist insurgency. (Human Rights Watch 2004)

As a non-state party, the Maoists are not and could not be signatories to the GCs. However, the Maoists have agreed through common Article 3 to be bound by all parts of the conventions, as is the state, regardless of reciprocity.

Despite both the aforementioned historical and legal context, widespread violations of IHL took place by both parties during the NIAC. According to INSEC, a politically-linked but nevertheless internationally-respected human rights NGO, 13,347 people were killed during the 10 years, 11,941 or 89 per cent of which were killed during the five years classed as a NIAC,[30] and up to 200,000 displaced during the period (BBC 2006; INSEC 2006). Of those that were killed, the Maoists are alleged to be responsible for 4,970, or 37 per cent, and state agents for 8,377, or 63 per cent. Until today, no exact figures exist as to the number of those killed that were civilians, although a range of studies predict this to be very high.[31] Some studies, such as those done by the INGO, South Asia Terrorism Portal are clearly unrealistic.[32] A more credible number is that stated by a Canadian Christian INGO, Ploughshares, which over three months in 2006 they place the numbers killed as 238 Maoists, 181 state actors and 61 civilians. Unfortunately, these figures will not concur with the combatant-civilian paradigm, as, for example, the number of Maoists killed could include administrative personnel or ‘cultural teams’ rather than combatants. In order to populate the required combatant-civilian paradigm, and without any available definitive figures from agencies such as the UN, the closest estimate we can extract is from the aforementioned INSEC report, which breaks down those killed according to occupation (INSEC 2006). Though by no means perfect, our summary in Table 1 estimates civilian deaths at 48 per cent of total deaths, with 31 per cent killed by state actors and 17 per cent by the Maoists. While state actors were responsible for more civilian deaths than the Maoists, as a percentage, both killed a similarly high number.

Number of civilians and combatants killed in Nepal conflict

Killed by state actors Killed by Maoists Total
Civilians 4,116 (49%) 2,174 (46%) 6,425 (48%)
Total combatants 4,261 (51%) 2,797 (56%) 7,058 (53%)
– Of which can only be regarded as probable combatants 4,235 (50.7%) 1,995 (40%) 6,230 (47%)
Total 8,377 (63%) 4,970 (27%) 13,347 (100%)

The armed conflict came to an end on 21 November 2006 with the signing of the Comprehensive Peace Accord (hereafter, CPA) between the Maoists and a new government, made up of political parties. Since agreeing to the accord, the national army and the Maoist’s military arm, the People’s Liberation Army, have been confined to barracks under the watchful eye of a UN mission. The Maoist’s party arm has been in and out of political power, alongside the political parties, during the development of a new constitution, due later in 2011.

Extent of protections for civilians in Nepal

There are two primary constraints to the extent to which IHL has provided protection to civilians in Nepal: the non-international nature of the conflict, and the lack of post-conflict enforcement.

Limitation 1: Protections for civilians are limited in NIAC

Any protections in IHL are limited according to the geopolitical nature of the conflict in question. IHL was originally and primarily concerned with international, inter-state armed conflict (hereafter, IAC) and the regulation of adverse national armies, as well as their interaction with each other and the civilians within their adversary’s territory. By its very nature, international law could not apply in a national situation, as it undermined the aforementioned sovereignty of the state. The GCs as written applied only to IAC, with the exception of common Article 3, which, put briefly, states that all parties, including non-state parties, are bound to treat ‘persons taking no part in the hostilities’ humanely, prohibiting violence, hostage-taking, outrages upon personal dignity, and sentencing outside of regular courts. AP2, which Nepal has not signed, was intended to supplement such legal brevity on NIAC, but many important tenets, such as the principle of distinction and the terminology of ‘combatant’ and ‘parties to the conflict’, were stripped out of the final draft by states worried of the potential threat from insurgents (Both 2004, p.8). Henckaerts compares AP2 to AP1, which applies to IAC:

‘Unlike Additional Protocol I, Additional Protocol II does not contain, however, specific rules and definitions with respect to the principles of distinction and proportionality. (Henckaerts, Doswald-Beck et al. 2005, p.xxxv)

Continuing that comparison, AP1 has more than 80 substantive articles regulating IAC, whereas AP2 has a meagre 15 covering NIAC. The high level of codification of protections for civilians in IAC under GC4 and AP1 is far stronger as compared to the codification for NIAC under common Article 3 and AP1, which Gasser regards as ‘summary in nature’ (Gasser 1995, p.209). In addition, as compared to the GCs, which bind 194 states, only 165 states have ratified or acceded to AP2. Many of those states that have not signed AP2 are those that, like Nepal, would be most affected by it. Kellenberger, president of the ICRC concludes:

‘[I]nternational humanitarian law applicable to non-international armed conflict falls short of meeting the protection needs arising from these conflicts. As admitted by the diplomatic conferences that adopted them, Article 3 common to the Geneva Conventions and Protocol II additional to those Conventions represent only the most rudimentary set of rule. (Kellenberger 2005, p.xvi)

For civilians in Nepal therefore, AP2 does not apply and common Article 3 is insufficient.

A secondary issue has arisen in the case of Nepal from the absence of a ‘combatant’ status in NIAC. Neither common Article 3 nor AP2 define or give status to a non-state fighter. Everyone is categorised as civilians or ‘persons taking no active part in the hostilities’ until they take part in fighting, upon which they enter a legal vacuum with none of the protections given to ‘combatants’ such as prisoner of war status, and none of the rules of humane treatment provided for under common Article 3 (Both 2004, p.5). Once the hostilities are over, such fighters in Nepal melt back into the civilian population as civilians, and yet remain dangerous to the state. In practice, this lack of clear definition has led to greater infringements on legitimate civilians who have become victims of a suspicious and invasive state army. Fleck states:

‘Ordinary soldiers would be required to make complex and immediate assessments as to whether an individual’s participation in hostilities is ongoing, at a time when the facts available are incomplete or unclear (Fleck 2006, p.5)

In the absence of ‘combatant’, the state has also been able to categorise the Maoists as ‘terrorists’. Under the Terrorist and Disruptive Activities Ordinance, Maoists, regardless of whether they are ‘persons taking no active part in the hostilities’ and therefore civilians, can be held without trial for up to 12 months, seemingly in contravention on common Article 3(1)(d). According to Watkin, IHL is therefore:

‘[O]nly as effective as the accuracy with which “combatants” as a group are defined and the degree that there is a common understanding of the cross over criteria for civilians losing the protection of their status. If the line between combatant and civilian is drawn in the wrong place or is more porous than the law on its face indicates then the ability of the law to regulate the conduct of hostilities can be adversely impact. (Watkin 2003, p.3)

This is not to say that civilians in Nepal are completely unprotected in IHL. Indeed, one of the primary reasons for the ICRC’s extensive Customary Rules was the need to clarify such protections, with a resultant total of 145 of the 161 identified rules applying in NIAC. An example of a general trend toward customary IHL being applicable in NIAC can be seen as early as 1968 in UN General Assembly Resolution 2444, which recognises ‘the necessity of applying basic humanitarian principles in all armed conflicts’ (my underscore). The Resolution went on to include the principle of distinction and proportionality, and was regarded by the USA as representing existing customary IHL at the time.[33] This message was repeated by an ICTY appeal chamber decision in 1995:

‘Since the 1930s, however, the aforementioned distinction [between NIAC and IAC] has gradually become more and more blurred, and international legal rules have increasingly emerged or have been agreed upon to regulate internal armed conflict […] If international law, while of course duly safeguarding the legitimate interests of States, must gradually turn to the protection of human beings, it is only natural that the aforementioned dichotomy should gradually lose its weight.[34]

The same case also held that the principles of IAC, such as distinction and proportionality, also apply in NIAC.[35] The case holds Moir’s statement as follows to be now outdated:

‘While the Geneva conventions and Additional Protocol I do contain provisions aimed at the repression and punishment of breaches, or at any rate grave breaches, provisions governing the enforcement of common Article 3 and Additional Protocol II are sadly lacking. (Moir 1998, p.163)

The decision by the ICTY to allow the prosecution of violations of common Article 3 in NIAC has since been supported and added to by the statutes of the ICTR[36] and the ICC,[37] which outline and expand the list of such violations applicable for prosecution.

Limitation 2: enforcement of IHL limited

‘The main problem facing the international community today lies not in the content of those rules, but rather in their enforcement.’ (Moir 1998, p.163)

Nepal is not a signatory to the Rome Statute, despite a parliamentary order and promises from government,[38] and therefore the onus is upon the state to enforce IHL nationally. The CPA and various government statements since have committed to addressing violations of IHL by both parties during the NIAC. The CPA’s preamble clearly states that the parties are: ‘Remaining committed towards […] international humanitarian laws’,[39] repeated under Article 7: ‘remaining committed to […] international humanitarian law’,[40] but with no greater detail except Article 5.2.5:

‘Both sides agree to constitute a High-level Truth and Reconciliation Commission through mutual agreement in order to investigate truth about those who have seriously violated human rights and those who were involved in crimes against humanity in course of the war and to create an environment for reconciliation in the society.

The 2007 Interim Constitution has since supplanted the CPA. It contains further confirmation of the government’s intentions regarding violations of IHL. Part 4, ‘Responsibilities, directive principles and policies of the state’, is largely a description of intended policies, but provides a responsibility to establish an ‘Investigation Commission’ to probe disappearances,[41] provide compensation and rehabilitation for victims of the conflict[42] and their property.[43] It also pledges:

‘to constitute a high-level Truth and Reconciliation Commission to investigate the facts about those persons involved in serious violations of human rights and crimes against humanity committed during the course of conflict, and to create an atmosphere of reconciliation in the society.’[44]

Part 4 overlooks, presumably intentionally, criminal prosecutions for violations of IHL, but what little it does require of the state, is nullified by Article 36, ‘Questions not to be raised in court’:

‘No question shall be raised in any court as to whether provisions contained in [Part 4] are implemented or not[45]

According to Supreme Court Justice and Chairman of the Interim Constitution Drafting Committee, Laxman Prasad Aryal, additional clauses on impunity were removed in the final draft of the constitution by the then government (Nepal Law 2007). This is not surprising, bearing in mind that the last two national investigations into violations of IHL, the Malik Commission in 1990 and the Rayamajhi Commission in 2006, were either ignored, or as in the latter case, never published.

In April 2010, the government began to fulfil the constitutional directive and registered a parliamentary bill for a Truth and Reconciliation Commission. The process has since stalled, however. According to the media, the delay has primarily been due to a difference in opinion, with the Maoists pushing for emphasis to be placed upon reconciliation mechanisms, and others more interested in truth and eventually prosecution (Acharya 2011). The Maoist’s intransigence towards prosecutions has been demonstrated by the inclusion, on 11 May 2011, of Agni Sapkota, a wanted man, as the new Minister of Information and Communications.[46] The army has equally refused to engage with IHL proceedings, consistently ignoring habeas corpus orders by the courts and protecting those accused of violations of IHL.[47] According to the army’s ‘Human Rights Directorate’, 283 unnamed soldiers have been punished by military court martial with sentences ranging from warnings to 10 years imprisonment, but no further information exists and most sentences are believed to be negligible (Bell 2007). The Maoists have similarly claimed that they maintain a system of internal court martial, but have provided no further information.

It is widely believed by the public that neither governmental party will allow their own supporters to face prosecution for violations of IHL.[48] The Maoists because they see the courts as biased, and the political parties because they see the institution of the army as the last bastion against the Maoists. The Supreme Court, seemingly the lone state institution pursuing prosecution, has issued a number of indictments and orders, all ignored, including an order for the government to establish a high level commission of inquiry into disappearances during the NIAC, as pledged in the Interim Constitution.[49] The only step that the government has taken, the aforementioned draft bill on a Truth and Reconciliation Commission, is, according to Amnesty International, incompatible with IHL, providing for amnesty for violators and introducing a statute of limitations to violations (Amnesty International 2010). Bell believes that without stronger safeguards the draft bill could also make matters worse by using financial compensation to reward political patronage among some groups, without providing justice to others (Bell 2007). Bell continues that this is already happening in practice; Maoists have reportedly extorted money from local people to pay compensation to others for violations of IHL. Worse still, post-conflict governments led by both the Maoists and the political parties have at different times since the NIAC ended withdrawn registered criminal cases, 349 and 282 respectively, most of them alleged murders (Advocacy Forum 2010).

Even if violators were prosecuted, very few laws exist on the Nepali law books that would cover violations of IHL. According to Appeals Court Judge Bhattrai, there exist only limited laws on sexual assault, enslavement, forcible transfer of population and destruction of property, and no laws that criminalise torture, enforced disappearance, abduction, taking of hostages, wanton attacks on civilians or persecution on the basis of political beliefs, race, ethnicity, culture or gender (Bhattarai 2007, p.10). In addition, there are no definitive positions in Nepali law on issues such as the exploitative commission, inducement, incitement or abating of crimes, and no duty of persons in authority to prevent or report crime. Referral to the ICC remains a possibility as a complementary court, and one that has reportedly been the subject of much diplomatic pressure in Kathmandu (French Embassy Kathmandu 2008). Indeed, although Nepal remains a non-signatory to the Rome Statute, recent happenings in regards to Libya, another non-signatory but referred to the ICC by UN Security Council Resolution 1973, demonstrates that this is no longer an unassailable protection for violators. Whether this threat gives the parties the impetus to prosecute and enforce the IHL protections for Nepali civilians at a national level is however open to see.

Conclusion

IHL is intended and does indeed provide for a range of protections for civilians. Unfortunately however, the natural desire of the state, as in the case of Nepal, is to retain the status quo and establish a check upon the ability of people to self determine. As such, at every opportunity the states had, they codified an IHL system to obstruct internal, national attempts to transform the state, and created a situation whereby state forces were curbed from hurting their neighbour’s people, but could lash out at their own civilians with little consequence. At least, this would have been correct until when, in the late 20th century, a less state-friendly interpretation of IHL began to develop as led by judges in a series of tribunals around the world. Today, internationally agreed protections for civilians in NIAC are rapidly increasing due to decisions being made in such tribunals together with efforts by organisations such as the ICRC to consolidate customary IHL. However, as we have explored, violations of IHL continue and any enforcement of legal protections for civilians remains slow to manifest in countries like Nepal. Attempts to enforce IHL are generally weak and remain the concern of civil society, while governments and other powerful actors speak of compromise and rapprochement, and rarely of prosecution.

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Footnotes

[1] It does not cover jus ad bellum, the acceptable justifications for war, which is outlined under Articles 43-51 of the United Nations Charter.

[2] GC1 on the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field, 1864; GC2 on the Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea, 1906; GC3 on the Treatment of Prisoners of War, 1929; and, GC4 on the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, 1949

[3] AP1 relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts, 1977; AP2 relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts, 1977; and AP3 relating to the Adoption of an Additional Distinctive Emblem, 2005

[4] Another important review of customary IHL carried out by the academic Dieter Fleck is the San Remo Manual on the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts, available at www.dur.ac.uk/resources/law/NIACManualIYBHR15th.pdf

[5] Art. 9-11

[6] Art. 1-3

[7] Art. 4

[8] Art. 43-4

[9] GC4 Art. 5

[10] Art. 27

[11] Art. 46

[12] Rule 6 Henckaerts, J.-M., L. Doswald-Beck, et al. (2005). Customary international humanitarian law. Cambridge ; New York, Cambridge University Press.

[13] Rules 11, 14, 71

[14] Rules 1, 6

[15] Rules 7, 10

[16] Rule 2

[17] Rule 53

[18] Rule 54

[19] Rules 15, 87

[20] Rules 104, 105

[21] Rule 88

[22] Rules 89-100

[23] Rules 118-120

[24] See GC4 Art. 16-25

[25] For the principle of distinction, see AP1 Art. 48, 49(3) and 52(2); and Customary Rules 1 and 7

[26] For the principle of proportionality, see AP1 Art. 51(5)(b), 52(2), 57(2)(a)(iii) and 85(3)(b); Hague Convention Art. 22, 23(g) and 25; Rome Stature Art. 8(2)(b)(iv); and Customary Rule 14

[27] For the principle of necessity, see UK Ministry of Defence (2005)

[28] For the principle of unnecessary suffering, see Hague Regulations Art. 23(e); AP1 Art. 35(2); Rome Statute Art. 8(2)(b)(xx)

[29] ‘Threshold’ is a term in IHL to separate disturbances, riots, etc., as different to NIAC. The threshold for a NIAC is higher in AP2 than common Article 3, which refrains from defining it.

[30] 8,377 people were killed by the state and 4,970 killed by the Maoists. During the period regarded as a NIAC, 7,460 people were killed by the state and 4,481 killed by the Maoists (INSEC 2006).

[31] Well-regarded domestic NGOs that have carried out research include Advocacy Forum, INSEC, and the National Human Rights Commission. INGOs include Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch, the International Center for Transitional Justice, the UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights in Nepal and the UN Working Group on Enforced and Involuntary Disappearances

[32] SATP data available at www.satp.org shows 1,225 state agents killed, a high 5,023 Maoists killed, and a very small 184 civilians killed between 2001 and 2005. SATP data is sourced from newspapers, but such methodology does not take due regard of the lack of media independence or the periods of overt censorship of the press by the state, particularly during 2004-6.

[33] UN General Assembly, 1,634th meeting of the 23rd session in the 3rd Committee, A/C.3/SR.1634

[34] Prosecutor v. Tadic, ICTY Appeals Chamber Decision, 2 October 1995, para 97. at www.icty.org/x/cases/tadic/acdec/en/51002.htm

[35] Prosecutor v. Tadic, ICTY Appeals Chamber Decision, 2 October 1995, para 100-127. at www.icty.org/x/cases/tadic/acdec/en/51002.htm

[36] Art. 4

[37] Art. 8(2)(c) and 8(2)(e)

[38] The House of Representatives ordered the executive to accede to the Rome Statute on 25 July 2006 Chapagain, K. (2006). “Nepal parliament directs government to ratify International Criminal Court statute “. Retrieved 01/05/2011, from http://jurist.law.pitt.edu/paperchase/2006/07/nepal-parliament-directs-government-to.php.

. Prime minister Girija Prasad Koirala promised to do so on 27 August 2006 Lin, L. (2006). “Nepali PM committed to ratify ICC statute.” Retrieved 01/05/2011, from http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2006-08/27/content_5012190.htm.

[39] CPA unofficial translation, Preamble, para. 5, at www.nic.gov.np/download/interimconstitution.pdf

[40] CPA, Art. 7

[41] Interim Constitution, Art. 33(q)

[42] Interim Constitution, Art. 33(p)

[43] Interim Constitution, Art. 33(r)

[44] Interim Constitution, Art. 33(s)

[45] Interim Constitution, Art. 36(1)

[46] The Supreme Court ordered police to register a murder case against Sapkota in 2006 for the 2005 abduction and killing of a civilian, Arjun Lama. Sapkota however remains ‘at large’ and has repeatedly claimed either that it was a subordinate (he remains criminally responsible under Customary Rule 152 or 153) or that he cannot be prosecuted for action carried out following orders (he again remains criminally responsible under Customary Rules 154 and 155). Nepal has a history of Ministers from all parties that carry out or condone violations of IHL. In 2005, Dan Bahadur Shahi, Minister for Home, Law and Justice, continuously repeated his approval of killings to amongst others, the BBC, stating that recourse to the courts, ‘is not relevant during a war’ (Bell 2005)

[47] According to Human Rights Watch, the little information available suggests extreme leniency from the army. The most well know case is that of Maina Sunwar, a 15-year-old schoolgirl tortured to death while in army custody in 2005. Despite the request of the courts, the alleged perpetrator, Colonel Babi Khatri, remains protected by the army.

[48] See surveys by the newsweekly, Nepali Times, at www.nepalitimes.com

[49] See for example a Supreme Court ruling on 1 June 2007 calling for the government to comply with international law (Amnesty International 2010).

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Poverty, mountain poverty?

ICIMOD is an interesting concept; an NGO set up to advocate on behalf of mountain people. What are the experiences and conditions of economically-deprived people that live in mountains and how does that differ from those in more accessible terrain?

Understanding Mountain Poverty in the Hindu Kush-Himalayas

Around 211 million people reside in the greater Himalayan region, but there is a lack of cohesive information on their socioeconomic status. In general, issues such as whether, how, and why mountain poverty differs from national poverty remain unaddressed.

This report attempts to identify, understand, and statistically substantiate the specificity of mountain poverty. It presents poverty profiles and trends for Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, Nepal, and Pakistan based on analysis of nationally representative livelihood survey data, and for China and Myanmar based on assessment of secondary data.

The findings establish the first empirical evidence across the eight Himalayan nations that poverty in the mountains is different from and (in all cases except India) higher than that in other geographic areas. The study demonstrates that, with the exception of the area investigated in India, poverty in the Hindu Kush-Himalayan mountain areas is high and persistent. Trend analysis was only possible in the case of Nepal, but this helped build the argument for persistent poverty.

The study found that poor infrastructure, lack of access to basic facilities, and unfavourable household composition were key characteristics of the poorest mountain areas in the region. The research analyses the causes of poverty in the mountains and provides statistically significant results for policy makers and development planners, showing that in these countries there is a high concentration of poverty determinants in mountain areas compared to that in other geographic areas.

Understanding Mountain Poverty in the Hindu Kush-Himalayas : Regional Report for Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Bhutan, China, India, Myanmar, Nepal, and Pakistan (2011)

Visit the ICIMOD website >

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Times of India highlights war crimes fallout

And so the backlash begins, as victims realise the extent of the Maoist-parties agreement on war crimes.

Slain brothers’ family fights Maoist Goliath for justice in Nepal

KATHMANDU: “I carry my brother’s last image everywhere with me,” says a smouldering Sabitri Shrestha, whipping out a piece of paper from her handbag and holding it aloft for all to see. There is a stunned silence punctuated by gasps. The black and white photo is that of a dead man lying in mud, a pool of dried blood encircling him.

“They didn’t even allow us to perform his last rites, threatening to kill us if we tried to do so,” says Shrestha as she begins to sob. “And now the government is trying to pardon the men who killed my brother and wanted his body to be left to jackals and vultures.”

The Shrestha family’s brush with Nepal’s ruling Maoist party started in 1998, two years after the communist insurgency had started. Sabitri’s brother Ujjan was killed by a group of rebels led by a powerful local Maoist leader Bal Krishna Dhungel. Dhungel became a member of parliament from the party after it signed a peace accord in 2006 and took part in elections two years later.

Nepal’s Supreme Court found Dhungel guilty of murder and sentenced him to prison for life. However, the court verdict was ignored by the Maoists, other major parliamentary parties as well as the house itself with the Maoist MP continuing to remain a lawmaker and out of prison.

This week, the Maoists, now back in power once more, added insult to the injury by asking the President Dr Ram Baran Yadav, to issue a pardon to Dhungel. The decision was endorsed by the cabinet headed by new Maoist Prime Minister Dr Baburam Bhattarai, who began his tenure this year with a clean image that however is rapidly tarnishing.

The Maoists say Dhungel is innocent and that the case against him was politically motivated. However, the apex court has found the Maoist leader guilty and several rights organisations, including the UN’s human rights office in Kathmandu, have come down heavily on the government for trying to pardon the tainted MP.

Advocacy Forum, a leading rights organisation, says Ujjan was killed not even due to political reasons but personal vendetta. He was wrongly accused of having impregnated a woman after he married Dhungel’s cousin. The cousin was from a different caste and inter-caste marriages often face a hard time in Nepal.

What makes the killing even more stark is the fact that Ujjan’s brother Ganesh was also killed by the Maoists for filing a complaint with police. The tragedy was further compounded when Ganesh’s daughter Rachana, who witnessed the murder of her father, killed herself in a fit of depression.

“Can Baburam Bhattarai bear it if his own child is killed and the murderer is allowed to go scot-free?” asks a weeping Ram Kumari, the slain brothers’ mother. The 79-year-old, along with her 81-year-old husband Jagat Das, has been reduced to sitting in protest before the prime minister’s office in the capital, stoically holding placards that say “You can’t grant amnesty to our son’s murderer” but to no avail.

Though Sabitri filed a petition in the apex court on Thursday against the PM, cabinet and the President, asking for the pardon to be scrapped, given the growing culture of impunity in Nepal, there is scant chance of her receiving justice from the Maoist government.

Though two of the other largest parties, the Nepali Congress and communists, flayed the government in parliament on Friday for over the pardon, the fact remains that they ignored the issue when they were in power. They have now seized it merely because as opposition parties they need a handle to beat the government with.

Constitutional experts are asking the President to strike a blow for justice. “The President can send the matter back to the cabinet for reconsideration,” said Bhimarjun Acharya, a leading lawyer. “Or he can consult experts to come up with his own decision.”

The President, though a constitutional head, played a key role in 2009 when the then Maoist government tried to sack the army chief. The President reinstated the sacked general, which subsequently led to the fall of the earlier Maoist government.

via Slain brothers’ family fights Maoist Goliath for justice in Nepal – Times Of India.

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Maoist-parties agreement begins to bite

Several weeks after the widely-acclaimed agreement between the Maoists and the other political parties which saw a decision on a “peace and reconciliation” committee, we are starting to see the outcomes.

Rather than “truth and justice” the government has decided, once again, that it is better to sweep crimes under the carpet.

Could it be that it is in the government’s interest not to bring themselves to justice? Where is the Supreme Court when it is needed…

UN concerned over recent Govt. decisions to appoint, pardon and promote alleged perpetrators of human rights violations

KATHMANDU – 10 November 2011 – The United Nations Human Rights Office in Nepal (OHCHR-Nepal) today expressed concern over a series of recent decisions by the Government of Nepal to appoint, promote or pardon public officials implicated in serious crimes and human rights abuses in Nepal. Such decisions, taken in relation to both senior politicians and officials of Nepal’s security forces, undermine efforts to address impunity in the country, and taint recent positive progress on the peace process.

More recently, on 8 November 2011 the Council of Ministers decided to appoint Constituent Assembly (CA) member Suryaman Dong Minister of State for Energy, despite an outstanding warrant for his arrest in relation to the abduction and murder of Arjun Lama in 2005. This comes after a similar Government decision in May to appoint CA member Agni Sapkota, also implicated in the Lama case, as a Government Minister. At the same meeting the Council of Ministers further agreed to request the President to pardon CA member Bal Krishna Dhungel. Dhungel was convicted in 2004 on murder charges, a verdict upheld by the Supreme Court in 2010, which has since reaffirmed that the sentence should be served.

A week earlier the Government had also decided to promote Durj Kumar Rai to the position of Additional Inspector General of the Armed Police Force. Rai’s promotion was approved despite his direct implication in the killing of pro-democracy demonstrators in 2006, for which the Rayamajhi Commission had recommended his criminal prosecution. In July 2011, the Nepal Army also promoted Brigadier General Victor Rana to Major General, despite his alleged command responsibility in relation to multiple cases of arbitrary detention, torture and disappearances at the Maharajgunj Barracks in 2003 and 2004. Neither Rai nor Rana have faced criminal investigation or prosecution in relation to these crimes.

“As the Government of Nepal takes important and positive steps to advance the peace process and establish transitional justice mechanisms to address past crimes, such decisions will establish a trend to entrench impunity and send the wrong message at the wrong time,” said Jyoti Sanghera, head of OHCHR-Nepal. “The Government should respect Nepal’s judiciary and the rule of law.”

बिहीबार, २०६८ कात्तिक २४

मानवअधिकार उल्लङ्‍घनका आरोपित पीडकहरूलाई नियुक्ति, क्षमादान र बढुवा गर्ने सरकारका हालैका निर्णयहरूप्रति राष्ट्रसङ्‍घ चिन्तित

काठमाडौँ, २०६८ कात्तिक २४ … नेपालस्थित संयुक्त राष्ट्रसङ्‍घीय मानवअधिकार कार्यालय (उच्चायुक्तको कार्यालय…नेपाल)ले नेपालमा गम्भीर अपराध तथा मानवअधिकार दुर्व्यवहारमा मुछिएका सार्वजनिक अधिकारीहरूलाई नियुक्ति, बढुवा र क्षमादान गर्ने नेपाल सरकारका हालैका शृङ्खलाबद्ध निर्णयहरूप्रति आज चिन्ता व्यक्त गरेको छ। वरिष्ठ राजनीतिज्ञ र नेपालका सुरक्षाफौजका अधिकारी दुवैका सम्बन्धमा लिइएका यस्ता निर्णयहरूले देशमा दण्डहीनतालाई सम्बोधन गर्ने प्रयासहरूलाई अवमूल्यन गर्नुका साथै शान्ति प्रक्रियामा हालै भएको सकारात्मक प्रगतिमा धब्बा लगाउनेछ।

हालसालै, २०६८ कात्तिक २२ गते मन्त्रिपरिषद्ले सन् २००५ मा भएको अर्जुन लामाको अपहरण र हत्यासँग सम्बन्धित स्थायी पक्राउ पुर्जी जारी भएका संविधानसभा सदस्य सूर्यमान दोङलाई ऊर्जा राज्यमन्त्रीमा नियुक्ति गर्ने निर्णय गर्‍यो। लामाको घटनामै मुछिएका संविधानसभा सदस्य अग्नि सापकोटालाई मईमा सरकारको मन्त्री नियुक्ति गर्ने यस्तै सरकारी निर्णयपछि यो निर्णय भएको हो। सोही बैठकमा मन्त्रिपरिषद् संविधानसभा सदस्य बालकृष्ण ढुङ्गेललाई क्षमादान गर्न राष्ट्रपतिसमक्ष अनुरोध गर्न पनि सहमत भयो। ढुङ्गेल सन् २००४ मा एउटा हत्याको अभियोगमा दोषी पाइएका थिए र सो निर्णयलाई सर्वोच्च अदालतले सन् २०१० मा सदर गरी त्यसयता सजाय भोग्नु नै पर्ने कुरालाई पुनर्पुष्टि गर्दै आएको छ।

एक साताअघि सरकारले दुर्जकुमार राईलाई सशस्त्र प्रहरी बलको अतिरिक्त महानिरीक्षक पदमा बढुवा गर्ने निर्णय गर्‍यो। सन् २००६ मा भएको लोकतान्त्रिक आन्दोलनमा सहभागी प्रदर्शनकारीहरूको हत्यामा उनी प्रत्यक्ष मुछिएको र रायमाझी आयोगले उनलाई फौजदारी अभियोजन गर्न सिफारिस गरेको भए तापनि राईको बढुवालाई अनुमोदन गरिएको थियो। सन् २०११ जुलाईमा नेपाली सेनाले पनि सहायकरथी भिक्टर राणालाई सन् २००३ र २००४ मा महाराजगन्त्र ब्यारेकमा भएका स्वेच्छाचारी थुना, यातना र बेपत्ता पार्ने कार्यका कैयौँ मुद्दाहरूका सम्बन्धमा उनको आरोपित कमान जिम्मेवारीका बाबजुद उपरथीमा बढुवा गरेको थियो। न राई न राणाले नै यी अपराधका लागि फौजदारी अनुसन्धान वा अभियोजनको सामना गर्नुपरेको छ।

“नेपाल सरकारले शान्ति प्रक्रियालाई अगाडि बढाउन तथा विगतका अपराधहरूका लागि सङ्क्रमणकालीन न्याय संयन्त्रहरू स्थापना गर्न महत्त्वपूर्ण र सकारात्मक कदम चाले पनि यस्ता निर्णयहरूले दण्डहीनतालाई अझ बलियो बनाउने प्रवृत्तिलाई स्थापित गर्नेछन् र गलत समयमा गलत सन्देश दिनेछन्,” उच्चायुक्तको कार्यालयकी प्रमुख ज्योति साङ्घेराले भन्नुभयो। “सरकारले नेपालको न्यायपालिका र कानुनी शासनको सम्मान गर्नुपर्छ।”

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An apolitical fighting force, or mercenaries?

The Guardian today states that Gurkha soldiers are known as “an apolitical fighting force”. Confusing, as this is what is normally regarded as the definition of mercenaries: those who fight for money rather than for state sovereignty.

Would the Guardian be calling those Niger combatants in Libya, an apolitical fighting force? Would it say the same for the recently-released Simon Mann,  the ex-British soldier and leader of the attempted Wonga Coup in Equitorial Guinea?

Arguably, do the Geneva Conventions even apply to Gurkha soldiers in the British army? (They don’t if you are a mercenary.)

Make your own mind up:

Gurkhas: the beginning of the end?

Gurkha redundancies and falling recruitment numbers threaten Nepalese warrior tribes’ 200-year tradition

As scores of British Gurkha soldiers are made redundant by the British army and recruitment numbers fall, there is deep concern among Nepal’s mountain tribes that their proud 200-year tradition could be under threat.

It is recruitment season in the Himalayan foothills, a time when recruiters for the British army, locally known as “Galla walla”, themselves former Gurkha soldiers, go from village to village looking for raw talent.

But this year there is a chill in the air. More than 140 Gurkha soldiers were told of their compulsory redundancy by the British army this year. In Nepal, where army pay makes a huge difference to poor communities, this is a blow.

“We hear more soldiers will lose their jobs. Recruitment is also down. I don’t know if the British government wants to do away with the Gurkha regiments,” said Mahesh Ale Magar, who, in August, sent his son Dip to try for this year’s regional selection at the British army camp in Pokhara, central Nepal.

It is a measure of the prestige attached to service with the Gurkhas that, despite being one of the toughest courses in the world, the selection process is keenly contested. Dip Magar was among more than 12,000 young hopefuls who applied this year for 176 posts in the British army; there were an additional 80 trying for the Gurkha Contingent Singapore police force.

To be considered Gurkha material candidates have to pass a series of demanding physical and mental tests. These include the infamous dokorace, in which potential recruits have to complete an uphill run of more than three miles carrying 35kg (77lb) of sand in a basket strapped to their backs.

Dip did not qualify. “My friends who qualified in regionals will take the next stage soon,” said the 18-year-old. “I will try again next year. It’s my dream to be a Gurkha.”

His earnest young face became anguished as he added: “I don’t know if I will get another chance. Some say that from next year, there will be norecruitment for the British army, only Singapore police.”

Rumours that the British Gurkha recruitment centres face the axe as part of Ministry of Defence spending cuts have been consistently denied by the army. Rebecca Clark, a spokesperson for the army’s 4th Division, which controls British Gurkhas Nepal, said: “Although there is a small reduction in the numbers that are being recruited, in proportion to the reduction in size of the future army the operation of the recruitment centres remains the same.”

But the so-called martial tribes, such as the Rai, Limbu, Gurung and Magar, from which the bulk of the Gurkha force is drawn, have seen British Gurkha numbers drop from a second world war peak of 112,000 men to the present-day level of 3,600.

The Gurkhas continue to put their lives on the line for the British military. Only last month a 21-year-old, Rifleman Vijay Rai of the 2nd Battalion, the Royal Gurkha Rifles, was killed in Afghanistan, dying from gun wounds after a checkpoint he was guarding was attacked. He had followed his father and brother into military service.

The tribes fear the Gurkha warriors will bear the brunt of military cuts. Under the strategic defence and security review, announced in October 2010, the MoD is to slash 7,000 jobs in the army, and it is expected that a third of the reduction will be achieved through a decrease in recruitment. The yearly Gurkha intake is now 176, down from 230 a few years ago. More redundancies seem almost certain.

Gurkha support groups, such as the Gurkha Justice Campaign, championed by the actor Joanna Lumley, have, in recent years, won high-profile victories in the campaign for better rights. In 2008 Gurkhas’ terms of service were improved, giving them terms similar to those of the rest of the army. Ironically, though, this has made the Gurkha units more vulnerable to cuts.

“Earlier, Gurkha units were cheaper to run than other British units,” said Raj Limbu, who served with the 7th Gurkha Rifles. “But now they’re equally costly.”

It is easy to see why young men like Dip are desperate to enlist in the Gurkhas. There are few jobs in the mountain villages of Nepal and the only alternative there is likely to be subsistence farming on the terraced slopes. A Nepalese farmer earns roughly £200 a year. A Gurkha soldier takes home almost 90 times as much.

But Gurkha veterans argue that the lure of the Gurkha life is about more than money. “It is a life-changing experience,” said Damarbahadur Gurung, a retired captain, who served for 22 years with the 2nd Gurkha Rifles, also known as the Sirmoor Rifles. “You’re educated and you see the world. That is why it is very important for the ethnic groups who have been traditionally known as martial tribes.”

In Nepal the families who serve in the British army are known as Lahures, after the city of Lahore in present-day Pakistan where the first Gurkha regiment was raised in the 19th century. Small in stature, but famed for their hand-to-hand combat skills with the kukri – a long, curved Himalayan knife – Gurkhas fought almost everywhere the British army went in the 20th century, garnering 13 Victoria Cross awards along the way. Their battle cry has remained “Ayo Gurkhali!” – the Gurkhas are upon you!

The Gurkha reputation for fearlessness has carried over into recent conflicts where they have been praised as a disciplined, determined and apolitical fighting force.

Dipprasad Pun, a corporal, was recently awarded the ConspicuousGallantry Cross by the Queen after he single-handedly thwarted a Taliban attack on his checkpoint in Afghanistan.

After he ran out of ammunition, Pun used the tripod of his machine gun to beat back the attackers.

Damarbahadur Gurung said: “I am proud to have served as a Gurkha in the British army. I hope I’m not among the last of a dying breed.”

Despite the uncertainty in London, up in the hills of Nepal becoming a Gurkha is still the dream of many a boy.

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Volunteers or abusers?

In many situations this is far too truthful, particularly for care homes (of which Al Jazeera did a great documentary recently). A past article wrote of one particular case whereby foreign nationals were being protected by their embassy from being investigated for multiple claims of abuse.

Surely there is a moral duty upon those organisations recruiting international volunteers – and making money from doing so – to do such checks?

Perhaps what this obscures is the reality that most child abusers in Nepal are not strangers or foreigners. They are Nepalis. But can we see any such similar glossy articles?

NEPAL: Protecting children from abuser-volunteers

A lack of protection policies is putting Nepal’s children at risk

KATHMANDU, 26 October 2011 (IRIN) – Business is booming for volunteer placement organizations attracting adventurous do-gooders to public service throughout this poor, picturesque country. But aesthetics and needs aside, an almost complete lack of regulation has made Nepal particularly vulnerable to the pairing of philanthropy and travel, experts say.

“A lot of times we find that in Asian countries, child serving organizations lack child protection policies, and procedures hence do not have systems in place to protect themselves from potential abusers,” Junita Upadhyay, programme deputy director of ECPAT, an international organization campaigning for the protection of children, told IRIN from Bangkok.

“Many organizations don’t require volunteers to have police checks, even when they have child protection policies… There is not enough dialogue in realizing the importance of such a policy, and the government regulations, if any, are weak.”

Indeed, Anish Neupane with VolNepal, a Kathmandu-based organization which matches volunteers with local NGOs, said in accepting their ever-increasing international placement requests – this year it will reach about 200 – his company proceeds on the grounds of “trust and faith” that volunteers have the best of intentions when requesting to work with children.

Similarly, Volunteer Nepal, established by American Michael Hess to place visitors primarily in Nepali orphanages and schools, does not perform background checks. “We should, but we don’t,” Hess said.

Hess added informal systems are in place in which volunteers are monitored with a sensitivity to any “red flags” that might arise.

While the vast majority of volunteers have the best of intentions, some do not, and child protection experts say unregulated volunteering is happening at the risk of everyone involved. Until the government implements regulations, the burden of protection falls on the organizations and the volunteers.

“At the very least there should be vetting procedures in place,” Aarti Kapoor, child-safe tourism manager with World Vision in Bangkok, told IRIN. “It can be relatively easier to start up a children’s organization in developing countries where the regulations aren’t yet fully developed.”

Take the case of Jean Jacques Haye, for example, a French paedophile who set up an orphanage in Nepal and sexually abused its inhabitants between 1985 and 2001.

He was extradited in 2010 and later sentenced to 10 years in prison in France. Variations of such abuses are sprinkled throughout other countries like Cambodia and Thailand, but a lax or nonexistent legal framework make such successfully tried cases rare.

Regulation

Of Nepal’s 602 child care homes housing 15,095 children, four are run by the government and nearly 60 percent are operating without evaluation.

A coalition of international organizations is working with the government towards a policy which incorporates best practices for any organization caring for children, but the trend of volunteers going into the child care homes continues mostly unnoticed.

“We know that child care homes are not running properly,” said Raghu Adhikari, programme manager of the Child Welfare Board. He explained the board is awaiting the government’s approval of a rights-based national child protection policy which will enhance Nepal’s Children’s Act of 1992. But without even a national constitution, this could take years, experts say.

In the meantime, ECPAT conducts child protection policy training in Nepal, emphasizing that an organization must protect itself just as much as the children it serves.

“When the government is not very good at regulating these institutions, the responsibility lies within the organization,” Upadhyay said. “It is fundamental to running a good institution that is serving children.”

Off the record

Though a walk down Thamel, Kathmandu’s backpacker area, yields relentless questioning from eager guesthouse owners as to whether or not a passerby is a volunteer, all non-tourist activity in Nepal is unofficial.

Volunteers are lumped in with the more than half a million tourists entering the country every year, de-regulating the experience even further.

“When you don’t have a law then so many things can go wrong, but if we have a law then we can regulate – we could have codes of conduct for volunteers,” said Sumina Tuladhar, executive director of Child Workers in Nepal (CWIN), a Kathmandu-based child advocacy organization. “But when you say volunteering is not legal, then you are not entitled to seek references, or check the background of volunteers coming to your organization. Then it becomes so much easier to come and go.”

Asking questions

International organizations like World Vision, Save the Children and Plan International, all partner with local NGOs and require criminal record checks for potential employees and volunteers. They also cycle through fewer people than those whose primary focus is the placement of tourists in volunteer experiences. In the last year, Save the Children Nepal took on five volunteers, against Volunteer Nepal’s 150.

Experts say volunteers seeking placement should ask a few key questions, starting with: “Would this be allowed in my own country?”

The more questions a volunteer asks, the more an organization will start to think about protecting the children involved, Upadhyay said.

via IRIN Asia | NEPAL: Protecting children from abuser-volunteers | Nepal | Children.

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It’s Liberia, but couldn’t it be Nepal?

 

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